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I. INTRODUCTION
In 1992, United States Supreme Court Justices Sandra Day O'Connor,
Anthony Kennedy, and David Souter published their famous "joint opinion"
in Planned Parenthood v. Casey.' That opinion presented a relatively
detailed theory on how to give content to general constitutional provisions,
like the meaning of liberty under substantive due process analysis,2 and the
relative weight to be given to precedent in deciding constitutional cases.'
Given their "joint" signing of this opinion, many commentators predicted
that these three Justices would form a relatively reliable "block" which
would control the outcome of Supreme Court cases for the foreseeable
future.4
It has certainly turned out that Justices O'Connor, Kennedy, and Souter
are the swing votes on the Court today. In most close cases, there is a
conservative block of Chief Justice Rehnquist and Justices Scalia and
Thomas on one side,5 and a more liberal block of Justices Stevens, Ginsburg,
and Breyer on the other side.6 However, it has not turned out that Justices
1. 505 U.S. 833 (1992).
2. Id. at 844-53. On the decision-making philosophy represented by the joint opinion in Casey,
see infra text accompanying notes 18-29; R. Randall Kelso, Styles of Constitutional Interpretation
and the Four Main Approaches to Constitutional Interpretation in American History, 29 VAL. U. L.
REV. 121, 166-67, 178-84 (1994) [hereinafter R. Kelso, Styles of Constitutional Interpretation].
3. 505 U.S. at 854-69. On the force of precedent in this approach, see infra text accompanying
notes 46-48; R. Randall Kelso & Charles D. Kelso, How the Supreme Court is Dealing with
Precedents in Constitutional Cases, 62 BROOKLYN L. REV. 973, 995-96 (1996) [hereinafter R. Kelso
& C. Kelso, Dealing With Precedents].
4. See, e.g., R. Randall Kelso, Separation of Powers Doctrine on the Modem Supreme Court
and Four Doctrinal Approaches to Judicial Decision-making, 20 PEPP. L. REV. 531, 596 n.245
(1993) [hereinafter R. Kelso & C. Kelso, Separation of Powers] (citing Linda Greenhouse, Changed
Path for the Court?: New Balance is Held by 3 Cautious Justices, N.Y. TIMES, June 26, 1992, at Al)
("[E]ffective control has passed to a subgroup of the majority, a moderately conservative middle
group of three Justices, Sandra Day O'Connor, Anthony M. Kennedy, and David H. Souter."); Paul
M. Barrett, High Court Wanders from Path to Right, WALL. ST. J., July 1, 1992, at B6 ("Emerging
Center Justices: Sandra O'Connor, Anthony Kennedy and David Souter voted for the same results
71% of the time.").
5. For example, during the 1999 Term, the most conservative member of the Court, Justice
Scalia, voted most often with Justice Thomas (89.6%) and Chief Justice Rehnquist (74.0%). The
Supreme Court: 1999 Term, 114 HARV. L. REV. 390, 391 (2000). This was also true in each of the
previous five years of the Court's current membership. See The Supreme Court: 1998 Term, 113
HARV. L. REV. 400-401 (1999) (explaining that Justices Scalia and Thomas voted together 77.2%;
Justice Scalia and Chief Justice Rehnquist voted together 73.7%); The Supreme Court: 1997 Term,
112 HARV. L. REV. 366, 367 (1998) (showing Justices Scalia and Thomas voting together 87.1%;
Justice Scalia and Chief Justice Rehnquist voting together 74.2%); The Supreme Court: 1996 Term,
111 HARV. L. REV. 431, 432 (1997); The Supreme Court: 1995 Term, 110 HARV. L. REV. 367, 368
(1996); The Supreme Court: 1994 Term, 109 HARV. L. REV. 340, 341 (1995).
6. For example, in each of the five terms of the Court prior to 1999, the most liberal member of
the Court, Justice Stevens, voted most often with Justice Ginsburg, and then with Justice Breyer.
The Supreme Court: 1998 Term, 113 HARV. L. REV. 400, 401 (1999) (describing that Justice
Stevens and Ginsburg voted together 63.2%; Justice Stevens and Breyer voted together, 57.1%); The
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O'Connor, Kennedy, and Souter always vote together. Indeed, in close
cases they will often split 2-1, sometimes with two joining the conservative
block,7 and other times two joining the more liberal block.8 This split occurs
because although these three share the decision-making philosophy
represented in Casey, nuances in how the theory is understood and applied in
different circumstances have led to different results.
Exploring these different nuances is the subject of this article. For
purposes of this exploration, every 5-4 opinion of the Supreme Court over
the last four Terms (1997-2000) will be considered, as well as other notable
5-4 opinions of the Court since Casey was decided in 1992. A complete
tabulation of the voting patterns in these cases appears in Appendix A of this
article.
Supreme Court: 1997 Term, 112 HARV. L. REV. 366, 367 (1997) (noting that Justices Stevens and
Ginsburg voted together 77.4%; Justices Stevens and Breyer voted together 76.3%); The Supreme
Court: 1996 Term, 111 HARV. L. REV. 431, 432 (1997); The Supreme Court: 1995 Term, 110 HARV.
L. REV. 368 (1996); The Supreme Court: 1994 Term, 109 HARV. L. REV. 340, 341 (1995). During
the 1999 Term, Justice Stevens again voted most often with Justice Ginsburg (85.7%), followed by
Justice Souter (84.4%) and then Justice Breyer (76.6%). The Supreme Court: 1999 Term, 114
HARV. L. REV. 391 (2000). The phrase "more liberal" block, rather than "liberal block", is used in
this article, because while Justices Stevens, Ginsburg and Breyer are more liberal than other
members on the current Court, they are not classic liberals in the tradition of Chief Justice Earl
Warren, or Justices Douglas, Brennan, Marshall, or Fortas. See generally R. Kelso, Separation of
Powers, supra note 4, at 581-83, 598-99; R. Kelso, Styles of Constitutional Interpretation, supra
note 2, at 227-28.
7. See, e.g., The Supreme Court: 1999 Term, 114 HARV. L. REV. 390, 395 (2000) (recognizing
that eleven of the eighteen 5-4 opinions involved this pattern); The Supreme Court: 1998 Term, 113
HARV. L. REV. 405 (1999) (noting that eight of the sixteen 5-4 opinions involved this pattern); The
Supreme Court: 1997 Term, 112 HARV. L. REV. 366, 371 (1998) (showing six of the fifteen 5-4
opinions involved this pattern); The Supreme Court: 1996 Term, Ill HARV. L. REV. 431, 434 (1997)
(stating that nine of the eighteen 5-4 opinions involved this pattern).
8. See, e.g., The Supreme Court: 1999 Term, 114 HARV. L. REV. 390, 395 (2000) (noting that
only one of the remaining seven 5-4 opinions involved this pattern); The Supreme Court: 1998 Term,
113 HARV. L. REV. 400, 405 (1999) (explaining that six of the remaining eight 5-4 opinions
involved this pattern); The Supreme Court: 1997 Term, 112 HARV. L. REV. 366, 371 (1998) (stating
that four of the remaining nine 5-4 opinions involved this pattern); The Supreme Court: 1996 Term,
Ill HARV. L. REV. 431, 434 (1997) (displaying that four of the remaining nine 5-4 opinions
involved this pattern). Of course, in some cases, these three Justices continue to vote together,
making the close case a 6-3 decision. See, e.g. United States v. LaBonte, 520 U.S. 751, 753 (1997)
(noting that the three Justices joined the conservative block to interpret the phrase "maximum term
authorized" under the Sentencing Commission guidelines as including "applicable statutory
sentencing enhancements."); Romer v. Evans, 517 U.S. 620 (1996) (displaying that the three Justices
joined the more liberal block to rule unconstitutional provisions based upon animus towards gays).
II. THE BASIC COMMON LAW/NATURAL LAW APPROACH OF THE JOINT
OPINION IN CASEY
Any judge faced with the task of interpreting a document must decide
what role various sources of meaning will play in the act of judicial
interpretation. With regard to constitutional interpretation, the judge must
decide, among other things, how much weight to give to six kinds of
considerations! The first three of these considerations involve sources of
constitutional meaning which were present at the time the constitutional
provision was ratified:
(l)The Constitution's text, including
(a) the literal meaning of the text, and
(b) the text's purpose or spirit;'
(2) Arguments derived from the context of the particular provision,
including
(a) related provisions and maxims of construction, and
(b) arguments derived from the overall structure of the Constitutional
design;" and
(3) Historical evidence concerning the framers and ratifiers'
(a) specific intent, and
(b) general intent.'"
9. These considerations are an elaboration of the approach to constitutional interpretation
provided by Professor Philip Bobbitt of the University of Texas School of Law. See generally PHILIP
BOBBITT, CONSTITUTIONAL FATE: THE THEORY OF THE CONSTITUTION 9-119 (Oxford University
Press 1982); PHILIP BOBBITr, CONSTITUTIONAL INTERPRETATION 31-42, 56-57 (Oxford University
Press 1991).
10. On arguments of literal text versus the purpose or spirit of the text, which might lead to a
different interpretation, see generally R. Kelso, Styles of Constitutional Interpretation, supra note 2,
at 128-30, and sources cited therein. As discussed there, on the one hand, "[Tihe general purpose is
a more important aid to the meaning than any rule which grammar or formal logic may lay down."
United States v. Whitridge, 197 U.S. 135, 143 (1905). On the other hand, judges must be careful in
using arguments of purpose or spirit, since "[t]he problem with spirits is that they tend to reflect less
the views of the world whence they come than the views of those who seek their advice." Public
Citizen v. United States Dep't of Justice, 491 U.S. 440, 473 (1989) (Kennedy, J., concurring).
I1. On related provisions and maxims of construction, see generally R. Kelso, Styles of
Constitutional Interpretation, supra note 2, at 131-32 (discussing interpreting constitutional
provisions in light of "related provisions in the same section or other parts of the Constitution";
verbal maxims of construction, like expressio unius est exclusio alterius (expression of one thing
excludes another) or ejusdem generis (where general words follow a list of specific words, the
general words should be held to apply only to the same kind or class as the specific words); and
policy maxims of construction, like construe penal provisions strictly and remedial provisions
broadly, or clear expression is needed for a provision to have retroactive effect). For an example of
use of related provisions in the classic case, McCulloch v. Maryland, 17 U.S. (4 Wheat.) 316, 413-20
(1819), see id. at 152. On structural arguments, see id. at 132-34; United States v. Lopez, 514 U.S.
549, 575 (1995) (Kennedy, J., concurring) ("[T]he various structural elements in the Constitution
[are] separation of powers, checks and balances, judicial review, and federalism.").
12. On the differences between specific versus general intent, see R. Kelso, Styles of
Constitutional Interpretation, supra note 2, at 135-36 (citing, inter alia, Richard H. Fallon, Jr., A
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The last three considerations involve sources of meaning which come
into existence after the constitutional provision is ratified.'" They are:
(4) legislative and executive practice under the Constitution; 4
(5) judicial precedent interpreting the Constitution;'5 and
(6) arguments concerning the consequences of a particular judicial
decision, including
(a) consequences in light of the provision's text, context, and history,
and
(b) consequences in terms of policy considerations. 6
Constructivist Coherence Theory of Constitutional Interpretation, 100 HARV. L. REV. 1189, 1198-
99 (1987)).
One helpful distinction distinguishes between "specific" or "concrete" and
"general" or "abstract" intent. Specific intent involves the relatively precise intent of the
framers to control the outcome of particular types of cases .... Abstract intent refers to
aims that are defined at a higher level of generality, sometimes entailing consequences
that the drafters did not specifically consider and that they might even have
disapproved.... [For example], the authors of the fourteenth amendment apparently did
not specifically intend to abolish segregation in the public schools. Yet they did intend
generally to establish a regime in which whites and blacks received equal protection of
the laws - an aspiration that can be conceived, abstractly, as reaching far more broadly
than the framers themselves specifically had intended.
Id.
Another example was given by Justice Ginsburg during her confirmation hearing. As she noted, the
general concept of equality in the Declaration of Independence and Equal Protection Clause of the
Fourteenth Amendment is broad enough to embody the principle of equal rights for women, despite
the fact that the specific views of many of the framers and ratifiers of the Constitution and the
Fourteenth Amendment were not receptive to women being full participants in public or private life.
See R. Kelso, Styles of Constitutional Interpretation, supra note 2, at 156-57.
13. Because these last three sources involve the Court considering material not in existence when
the provision was ratified, they can be called "subsequent" sources of meaning, rather than sources
"contemporaneous" to the provision's ratification. Id. at 123, 126-28.
14. On legislative and executive practice, see generally R. Kelso, Styles of Constitutional
Interpretation, supra note 2, at 140-42 (citing, inter alia, David M. O'Brien, The Framers' Muse on
Republicanism, The Supreme Court, and Pragmatic Constitutional Interpretation, 8 CONST.
COMMENTARY 119, 145 (1991) (quoting from a letter by James Madison) ("[T]he early, deliberate
and continued practice under the Constitution" is relevant in determining constitutional meaning));
Youngstown Sheet & Tube Co. v. Sawyer, 343 U.S. 579, 610-11 (1952) (Frankfurter, J., concurring)
("[A] systematic, unbroken, executive practice, long pursued to the knowledge of the Congress and
never before questioned ... may be treated as a gloss on 'executive Power' vested in the
President.").
15. On judicial precedent, see generally R. Kelso, Styles of Constitutional Interpretation, supra
note 2, at 138-40; R. Kelso & C. Kelso, Dealing With Precedents, supra note 3, at 983-86, 995-96
(discussing whether to overrule a precedent based upon such factors as whether the precedent
represents settled law, there has been substantial reliance on the precedent, the precedent is
unworkable in practice, the precedent is inconsistent or incoherent with related doctrines in the law,
a changed understanding of facts has undermined the basis for the precedent, the precedent
represents a substantially wrong or unjust interpretation of the law, or the precedent raises concerns
about a commitment to the rule of law).
16. On use of consequences in light of a provision's text, context, and history, see R. Kelso,
Naturally, different judges balance the weight to be given to these
sources of constitutional interpretation differently. In general, as with
common law or statutory interpretation, there are four main approaches that
a judge could adopt: natural law, formalism, Holmesianism, or
instrumentalism.'7 The various opinions of the Supreme Court Justices in
Casey provide good examples of each of these four approaches in use.
A. Sources of Constitutional Law in Casey
1. The Common Law/Natural Law Approach of the Joint Opinion in
Casey
The joint opinion in Casey of Justices O'Connor, Kennedy, and Souter
used the traditional common law approach to constitutional interpretation.
Under this approach, a judge should pay great attention to the eighteenth-
century and early-to-middle nineteenth century American judicial decision-
making traditions. This includes such principles as "reasoned elaboration of
the law in light of the law's purposes (its 'mischief to be remedied') and
history, fidelity to precedent, and fidelity to a considered and consistent
legislative or executive practice."' 8 To the extent that certain words in the
Styles of Constitutional Interpretation, supra note 2, at 145-46. On use of policy considerations in
constitutional interpretation, see id. at 142-44, 146. Note that in considering consequences in light
of a provision's text, context, and history, a judge is still attempting to carry out the intent of the
framers and ratifiers, and thus is engaged in "interpretive review." Id. at 145. If a judge resorts to
policy considerations independent of text, context, and history, the judge is engaged in "non-
interpretive" review, interpreting the Constitution "in light of value considerations that the judge
determines should be part of the Constitution." Id. at 143.
17. On these four judicial decision-making approaches generally, see R. Kelso, Separation of
Powers, supra note 4, at 532-63. On these four approaches applied to constitutional decision-
making, see R. Kelso, Styles of Constitutional Interpretation, supra note 2, at 150-225. On these
four approaches applied to statutory interpretation, see J. Clark Kelso & Charles D. Kelso, Statutory
Interpretation: Four Theories in Disarray, 53 SMU L. REV. 81 (2000) [hereinafter J. Kelso & C.
Kelso, Four Theories in Disarray]; R. Randall Kelso, Statutory Interpretation Doctrine on the
Modern Supreme Court and Four Doctrinal Approaches to Judicial Decision-making, 25 PEPP. L.
REV. 37, 41-58 (1997) [hereinafter R. Kelso, Statutory Interpretation Doctrine]. For further
discussion of these four decision-making styles in the context of common law, statutory, and
constitutional adjudication, see R. Randall Kelso & Charles D. Kelso, STUDYING LAW: AN
INTRODUCTION 101-23, 261-310, 388-423 (West Pub. Co. 1984).
18. R. Kelso, Styles of Constitutional Interpretation, supra note 2, at 166 (citing, inter alia,
David M. O'Brien, The Framers' Muse on Republicanism, the Supreme Court, and Pragmatic
Constitutional Interpretation, 8 CONST. COMMENTARY 119, 145 (1991)).
[A]mong the obvious and just guides to [interpreting] the [Constitution], Madison listed:
"I. The evils and defects for curing which the Constitution was called for & introduced.
2. The comments prevailing at the time it was adopted. 3. The early, deliberate, and
continued practice under the Constitution, as preferable to constructions adapted on the
spur of occasions, and subject to the vicissitudes of party or personal ascendencies.
Id. See also id. at 139 (citing Jefferson Powell, The Original Understanding of Original Intent, 98
HARV. L. REV. 885, 939 (1985) (explaining that for Madison, "'usus,' the exposition of the
Constitution provided by actual governmental practice and judicial precedents, could 'settle its
642
[Vol. 29: 637, 2002] Swing Votes on the Current Supreme Court
PEPPERDINE LAW REVIEW
Constitution were chosen to incorporate a natural law concept, those words
should be interpreted in light of that concept. Otherwise, words should be
given their ordinary, plain meaning. 9 A more complete elaboration of this
style of interpretation appears in Justice Story's Commentaries on the
Constitution of the United States."°
In terms of the six considerations listed above, this approach adopts as
relevant all of the above considerations except (6)(b), considerations of
policy. Policy considerations are viewed as appropriate only for the
legislative or executive branch, not the courts.2' However, under this
approach, a judge should give full weight not only to the contemporaneous
sources of text, purpose, structure, and history of the Constitution, but also
to subsequent events of legislative practice, executive practice, and judicial
precedent as part of "reasoned elaboration" of the law.2
meaning....')).
19. See generally R. Kelso, Styles of Constitutional Interpretation, supra note 2, at 166; R.
Kelso, Separation of Powers, supra note 4, at 546-49 (citing, inter alia, KERMIT L. HALL, THE
MAGIC MIRROR: LAW IN AMERICAN HISTORY 58 (1989)).
Beginning in the 1760s, Americans [tied] the idea of a written constitution to two related
notions, natural law and social contract.... Natural law theory and the social contract
gave American public law its emphasis on limited governmental power. If government
violated the social contract and if it denied natural rights and abused public trust, the
people retained a right to overthrow it.
Id. See also DANIEL A. FARBER & SUZANNA SHERRY, A HISTORY OF THE AMERICAN
CONSTITUTION 3-21, 219-21, 253-73 (1990); Edwin S. Corwin, The "Higher Law" Background of
American Constitutional Law L II, 42 HARV. L. REV. 149, 365 (1928-29).
20. JOSEPH STORY, COMMENTARIES ON THE CONSTITUTION OF THE UNITED STATES §§ 373-516
(5th ed. 1891) (1833). Building on Madison's insights, Justice Story discusses the natural law
approach to separation of powers, federalism, and the role of the courts in our democratic system.
His discussion embraces a sharing of powers, checks and balances approach, the need for a strong
federal government within a federal commitment to a dual theory of sovereignty, and a view that
courts should hold governmental actions unconstitutional if, on balance, the government violated the
Constitution. Id. §§ 306-96, 517-43. Story also indicates great faith in the Anglo-American
common law system and its preference for clearly defined legal tests, coherence and consistency in
legal categories, and deciding cases on narrower grounds where possible. Id. §§ 377-78, 399-407,
1568-70. On this approach representing a natural law approach to interpretation, see JAMES
MCCLELLAN, JOSEPH STORY AND THE AMERICAN CONSTITUTION 65 (reissued ed. 1990) (1971)
("Among the American lawyers and judges of [the early nineteenth century] Judge Story stands out
as possibly the most learned and influential defender of the natural law tradition.").
21. See R. Kelso, Styles of Constitutional Interpretation, supra note 2, at 159-64 (discussing that
our natural law tradition has consistently rejected any "Platonic Guardian" model of judicial
decision-making). As Justice Ginsburg stated at her confirmation hearing, "[Olne of the most sacred
duties of a judge is not to read her convictions into the Constitution." Id. at 163 n. 154.
22. Id. at 157-59, 164-65. For example, in Justice Kennedy's recent opinion for the Court in
Alden v. Maine, 527 U.S. 706 (1999), Justice Kennedy explicitly considered each of the arguments
of "text," id. at 730, and "history, practice, precedent, and the Constitution's structure," id. at 707, to
define the limits of the state sovereign immunity doctrine. And, with regard to text, Justice
Kennedy's opinion went beyond the "bare" literal text to consider background purposes of the
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With regard to text, the natural law approach requires weight be given to
both literal text and the text's purpose or spirit. 3 Thus, in Casey, the joint
opinion noted that while "a literal reading of the [Due Process] Clause might
suggest that it governs only the procedures by which a State may deprive
Eleventh Amendment. Id. at 734-35. For a classic article discussing the commonalities between this
concept of "reasoned elaboration" of the law and the methodology of the common law in general,
see Harry H. Wellington, Common Law Rules and Constitutional Double Standards: Some Notes on
Adjudication, 83 YALE L.J. 221 (1973). See also Catherine Kemp, Habermas Among the
Americans: Some Reflections on the Common Law, 76 DENY. U.L. REV. 961, 971 (1999) (arguing
that according to Phillip Bobbitt in CONSTITUTIONAL FATE, supra note 9, "common law forms -
conventions - are the source of the forms of constitutional argument.").
Note that the use of subsequent events means that a particular case result under the
Constitution may be different today than it would have been two-hundred years ago. Under this
approach, the Constitution is a "living" document, rather than a "static" document, as it is for a
formalist judge. See infra text accompanying notes 30-34. One of the most famous examples of this
from a natural law perspective is President Madison's statement in 1816 that, although he viewed a
national bank as unconstitutional in 1791, he now supported the constitutionality of a national bank
based upon "repeated recognitions, under varied circumstances, of the validity of such an
institution." See R. Kelso, Styles of Constitutional Interpretation, supra note 2, at 141. This mode
of constitutional interpretation was adopted by the Supreme Court in Chief Justice Marshall's
opinion in McCulloch v. Maryland, 17 U.S. (4 Wheat.) 316, 401 (1819) ("The principle now
contested was introduced at a very early period of our history, has been recognized by many
successive legislatures, and has been acted upon by the judicial department, in cases of peculiar
delicacy, as a law of undoubted obligation."), discussed in R. Kelso, Styles of Constitutional
Interpretation, supra note 2, at 158. A Holmesian statement of this principle occurred in Justice
Holmes' opinion for the Court in Missouri v. Holland, 252 U.S. 416, 433 (1920) ("The case before
us must be considered in light of our whole experience and not merely in that of what was said a
hundred years ago."), and in Justice Frankfurter's concurrence in Youngstown Sheet & Tube Co. v.
Sawyer, 343 U.S. 579, 610-11 (1952) ("[A] systematic, unbroken executive practice, long pursued
by the knowledge of Congress and never before questioned ... may be treated as a gloss on
'Executive Power' vested in the President."). See generally R. Kelso, Styles of Constitutional
Interpretation, supra note 2, at 141-42. An instrumentalist judge might phrase this "living" aspect of
the Constitution as the Constitution itself not changing, but rather its meaning-particularly its
general principles, like liberty, equality, or freedom of speech-being "illuminated" better over time
by later events. As Justice Cardozo noted in his famous opinion in MacPherson v. Buick, 111 N.E.
1050 (1916), when he was Chief Justice of the New York Court of Appeals, "The principle that the
danger must be imminent does not change, but the things subject to the principle do change." Id. A
more "realist" statement of this fact might state that the Constitution does in fact "evolve" over time
in response to its interaction with later events. See KARL LLEWELLYN, THE COMMON LAW
TRADITION 436-37 (1960) ("But so far as it suggests that principles themselves do not change, the
suggestion is legal convention and not legal fact. Principles are born in travail, and some of them
die, and sometimes, like the one here, they take new shape in mid-career."). On this concept of a
"living" Constitution, see generally Barry Friedman & Scott B. Smith, The Sedimentary
Constitution, 147 U. PA. L. REV. 1 (1998); Larry Kramer, Fidelity to History-and Through It, 65
FORDHAM L. REV. 1627 (1997), cited in Daniel A. Farber, Disarmed by Time: The Second
Amendment and The Failure of Originalism, 76 CHI.-KENT L. REV. 167, 189 n.93 (2000). See also
supra note 18 & infra note 98.
23. See R. Kelso, Styles of Constitutional Interpretation, supra note 2, at 150-52 (citing, inter
alia, Michael Moore, A Natural Law Theory of Interpretation, 58 S. CAL. L. REV. 277, 383-84
(1985)).
Once a judge determines the ordinary meaning of the words that make up a text... [the]
judge must check.., how well such an interpretation serves the purpose of the rule in
question. The necessity for asking this question of purpose Lon Fuller made familiar to
us in his famous 1958 debate with H.L.A. Hart.
Id.
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persons of liberty... the Clause has been understood to contain a
substantive component as well. ,, " When considering history, the natural
law approach moves beyond the specific intent of the framers and ratifiers to
consider arguments of general intent." Thus, in Casey, the joint opinion
rejected the view that "the Due Process Clause protects only those practices,
defined at the most specific level, that were protected against government
interference by other rules of law when the Fourteenth Amendment was
ratified."26 Instead, the joint opinion concluded in general terms that "the
heart of liberty is the right to define one's own concept of existence, of
meaning, of the universe, and of the mystery of human life.""
The natural law approach of "reasoned elaboration" also recognizes the
weight given to subsequent events, "living" traditions determined both by
legislative and executive action and by judicial precedents decided after the
relevant constitutional provision was ratified.8 The natural law approach in
Casey utilizes reasoning about consequences, to the extent those
consequences illuminate arguments of text, structure, history, practice, and
precedent, and do not represent policy decisions by the Court.
24. 505 U.S. at 846.
25. R. Kelso, Styles of Constitutional Interpretation, supra note 2, at 154-57.
26. 505 U.S. at 847. This rejection was foreshadowed by Justices O'Connor and Kennedy's
refusal to join footnote 6 of Justice Scalia's opinion in Michael H. v. Gerald D., 491 U.S. 110, 127-
28 n.6 (1988), which adopted the specific intent approach. See id. at 132 (O'Connor, I., concurring
in part) ("On occasion the Court has characterized relevant traditions protecting asserted rights at
levels of generality that might not be 'the most specific level' available. I would not foreclose the
unanticipated by the prior imposition of a single mode of historical analysis." (citation omitted)).
27. 505U.S.at851.
28. Id. at 850 (citing Poe v. Ullman, 367 U.S. 497,542 (1960) (Harlan, J., dissenting) ("The
balance of which I speak is the balance struck by this country, having regard to what history teaches
are the traditions from which it developed as well as the traditions from which it broke. That
tradition is a living thing.")).
Our cases recognize 'the right of the individual, married or single, to be free from
unwarranted governmental intrusion into matters so fundamentally affecting a person as
the decision whether to bear or beget a child." .. . [I]n some critical respects the abortion
decision is of the same character as the decision to use contraception, to which [Griswold,
Eisenstadt, and Carey v. Population Services International] afford constitutional
protection. We have no doubt as to the correctness of those decisions.
Id. at 851-52. See also supra text accompanying note 22 (discussing "living" versus "static"
interpretations of the Constitution).
29. Id. at 851-52 (discussing the fact that abortion is "an act fraught with consequences" in terms
of the "liberty of the woman," and it is relevant that it is "intimate and personal" because the
constitutional definition of liberty protects "the most intimate and personal choices a person may
make in a lifetime"). An approach that goes beyond the Casey joint opinion's consideration of
consequences to consideration of social policy appears in Justice Blackmun's opinion in Roe v.
Wade, where Justice Blackmun explicitly considered the "specific and direct harm," both medical
and psychological, that laws restricting abortion may have. Roe v. Wade, 410 U.S. 113, 153 (1973).
See infra text accompanying note 40.
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2. Formalist & Holmesian Approaches in the Dissents in Casey
a. The Formalist Approach in Casey
A formalist approach to constitutional interpretation rejects the view of
the Constitution as a living document. Rather, it views the Constitution as
having a fixed, static meaning that can only be changed by the formal
process of constitutional amendment. Thus, the formalist approach to
constitutional interpretation focuses almost exclusively on contemporaneous
sources of meaning. This is because they existed at the time the document
was ratified, which is the time the document's meaning is fixed. Under this
approach, the literal meaning of constitutional text, and the framers and
ratifiers' specific historical intent, are the critical sources of meaning to
consider. For formalist judges, arguments of purpose, general intent, or
structure are typically too vague or easily manipulated by judges wishing to
impose their own policy preferences on the Constitution; focusing on literal
meaning and specific historical intent leads to more certain and predictable
rulings?0 The only major exception to this focus on contemporaneous
sources of meaning is for well-established precedents that represent settled
law, which a formalist judge may follow despite disagreeing with the
doctrine's statement of the law."
30. On this formalist approach to constitutional interpretation, see generally R. Kelso, Styles of
Constitutional Interpretation, supra note 2, at 184-87, and sources cited therein (citing, inter alia,
Frederick Schauer, Formalism, 97 YALE L.J. 509, 532-35, 544-48 (1988) (discussing a "presumptive
formalism" where factors outside the "literal" rule, such as purpose, can affect interpretation if
"predictability, stability, and decision-maker restraint" are not decreased too much and literalism
would lead to "especially outrageous" results). See also JUSTICE ANTONIN SCALIA, A MATTER OF
INTERPRETATION: FEDERAL COURTS AND THE LAW (Princeton University Press 1997). Some
individuals call this a "strict constructionist" approach to the Constitution, based on the fact that only
contemporaneous sources of meaning are used, and thus the Constitution has a strictly fixed, rather
than living, meaning. However, as Justice Scalia has noted, the formalist approach does not
necessarily adopt a strict, or narrow, construction of all constitutional provisions. While there is a
policy maxim of strict construction of penal statutes, see supra text accompanying note 11, that
policy maxim does not apply to constitutional provisions in general. Thus, Justice Scalia rejects use
of the phrase "strict constructionist" to describe his formalist, or as he calls it "textualist," approach
to constitutional interpretation. SCALIA, supra, at 23-25. The phrase "textualism" is not used in this
article because all four judicial decisionmaking styles start their constitutional analysis with "text."
The differences among the four styles emerge when considering what other sources to use in
addition to text, and how to use them. Further, note that this strict constructionist/textualist/formalist
approach is not necessarily synonymous with interpreting the Constitution according to the "original
intent" of the framers and ratifiers. The framers and ratifiers probably had more in mind the common
law/natural law theory of interpretation with which they were familiar. See generally supra text
accompanying notes 18-29; R. Kelso, Styles of Constitutional Interpretation, supra note 2, at 150-
84.
31. On this aspect of the formalist approach to precedent, see infra text accompanying notes 34,
44; R. Kelso & C. Kelso, Dealing With Precedent, supra note 3, at 990-93, and sources cited therein.
In addition, some formalists will make an exception to exclusive reliance on contemporaneous
sources of meaning for "a continued and consistent legislative or executive practice which indicates
a clear tradition on a specific issue to provide some gloss on meaning," as long as that practice does
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In Casey, the formalist approach is represented by Justice Scalia's
dissenting opinion. Justice Scalia's opinion excoriated the joint opinion for
its commitment to "reasoned elaboration" of the law, rather than fixed
constitutional meaning, and for its "emptiness" because based upon
"theoretical" and "abstract" reasoning. 2 Based upon literal text and specific
historical intent, Justice Scalia concluded that Roe v. Wade was wrongly
decided.3 As Roe was wrongly decided, and it did not represent settled law,
Roe should be overruled.'
b. The Holmesian Approach in Casey
While sharing the formalist emphasis on literal meaning and specific
historical intent, a Holmesian approach is willing to go beyond literal
meaning and specific intent either where strong purpose or general intent
arguments exist, or strong legislative or executive practice arguments so
counsel. This is because the Holmesian approach is a functional approach
which understands that constitutional provisions have purposes which
should be followed and thus interpretation is not just an exercise in
dictionary definitions, and because the Holmesian approach has a strong
deference to government component which counsels great attention be paid
to legislative and executive practice.3" As a functional approach, the
Holmesian approach is also willing to consider following precedents on
which individuals have substantially relied, in addition to the formalist
approach of following precedents so well-established that they represent
settled law.36
not "override clear textual commands of the Constitution." R. Kelso, Styles of Constitutional
Interpretation, supra note 2, at 186 (discussing, inter alia, Justice Scalia's stated willingness to
consider a tradition of specific legislative enactments since 1868 to influence the meaning of liberty
under the Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment).
32. 505 U.S. at 981-85 (Scalia, J., dissenting).
33. Id. at 979-81.
34. Id. at 999. It should be noted that from a formalist perspective Justice Scalia is probably
right. Based upon literal text and specific historical intent, Roe probably is wrongly decided as
inconsistent with the specific intent of the framers and ratifiers in 1868, and not based on any literal
text in the Constitution. Additionally, because it is difficult to argue that Roe is settled law, given
the controversy that has always surrounded Roe, Roe should be overruled from a formalist approach
to precedent.
35. See R. Kelso, Styles of Constitutional Interpretation, supra note 2, at 195-200 (citing, inter
alia, James B. Thayer, The Origin and Scope of the American Doctrine of Constitutional Law, 7
HARV. L. REV. 129 (1893)).
36. On this aspect of the Holmesian approach to precedent, see R. Kelso & C. Kelso, Dealing
With Precedent, supra note 3, at 993-95, and sources cited therein. As stated therein,
In the classic case of substantial reliance, an individual has made a financial or
employment decision based on the current state of the law. If the law changes, there is no
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In Casey, as in Roe itself, this approach is represented by Chief Justice
Rehnquist's opinion. Under a Holmesian deference to government
approach, great emphasis should be paid to legislative and executive practice
subsequent to 1868 to determine the meaning of liberty for purposes of
substantive due process analysis. In terms of this legislative and executive
practice, the relative lack of legislative and executive enforcement regarding
access to contraception at the time of Poe v. Ullman and Griswold v.
Connecticut is different than the more vigorous enforcement practice
regarding access to abortion at the time that Roe was decided; thus, Griswold
is arguably right, while Roe is wrong.37 As Roe is wrong, unsettled law, and
there has been no substantial irreversible reliance on Roe, from a Holmesian
perspective Roe should be overruled. 8
practical way to restore the status quo. Time has passed and other financial or
employment opportunities have gone by the board. In a practical sense, reliance is
irreversible. Yet there are other cases where persons can modify their behavior with
respect to a new law, and prior reliance is reversible. Such cases do not present
compelling circumstances for the application of stare decisis based upon concern for
substantial reliance.
Id. at 994. On this Holmesian approach to precedent, see also infra text accompanying note 38.
37. Compare Casey, 505 U.S. at 952 (Rehnquist, C.J., dissenting)
[11n 1868, at least 28 of the then-37 States and 8 Territories had statutes banning or
limiting abortion.... By the middle of the present century, a liberalization trend had set
in. But 21 of the restrictive abortion laws then in effect in 1868 were still in effect in
1973 when Roe was decided, and an overwhelming majority of States prohibited abortion
unless necessary to preserve the life or health of the mother.
Id. and id. at 953 ("The Court in Roe reached too far when it analogized the right to abort a fetus to
the rights involved in Pierce, Meyer, Loving, and Griswold') with Poe v. Ullman, 367 U.S. 497,
554-55 (1961) (Harlan, J., dissenting).
But conclusive, in my view, is the utter novelty of this enactment. Although the Federal
Government and many States have at one time or other had on their books statutes
forbidding or regulating the distribution of contraceptives, none, so far as I can find, has
made the use of contraceptives a crime. Indeed, a diligent search has revealed that no
nation, including several which quite evidently share Connecticut's moral policy, has
seen fit to effectuate that policy by the means presented here.
Id.
Note that while Justice White, who typically follows a Holmesian approach, see R. Kelso,
Separation of Powers, supra note 4, at 583-84, dissented in Roe and Casey, 410 U.S. 113, 221
(1973); 505 U.S. 833, 944 (1992), White agreed that Connecticut's statute regarding access to
contraceptives in Griswold was unconstitutional. Griswold v. Connecticut, 381 U.S. 479, 502
(1965).
38. See Casey, 505 U.S. at 956 ("[R]eliance interests would not be diminished were the Court to
go further and acknowledge the full error of Roe, as 'reproductive planning could take virtually
immediate account of' this action."). Note that the joint opinion in Casey did suggest that reliance
interests favored upholding Roe, based upon the argument that
The ability of women to participate equally in the economic and social life of the Nation
has been facilitated by their ability to control their reproductive lives.... [Wihile the
effect of reliance on Roe cannot be exactly measured, neither can the certain cost of
overruling Roe for people who have ordered their thinking and living around that case be
diminished.
Id. at 856.
In response, Chief Justice Rehnquist noted,
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3. The Instrumentalist Approach in the Blackmun Concurrence in
Casey
The instrumentalist approach is represented in Casey by Justices
Blackmun and Stevens. They would follow Roe v. Wade in its entirety,
making every burden on abortion rights subject to strict scrutiny,39 following
Roe's concern about specific harm if a pro-choice position is not adopted."°
This approach differs from the natural law approach, where policy
considerations do not come into play, and the Court does not sit as a super-
legislature. Thus, the specific harm paragraph in Roe, central to Justice
Blackmun's opinion, is not present in the joint opinion in Casey, and not
every regulation of abortion is constitutionalized under a strict scrutiny
approach." The importance of the undue burden analysis is to ensure that
not every regulation triggers strict scrutiny, and thus the Court does not act
as a super-legislature second-guessing every aspect of abortion regulation."
The joint opinion thus turns to what can only be described as an unconventional-and
unconvincing- notion of reliance .... Surely it is dubious to suggest that women have
reached their 'places in society' in reliance upon Roe, rather than as a result of their
determination to obtain higher education and compete with men in the job market, and of
society's increasing recognition of their ability to fill positions that were previously
thought to be reserved only for men.
Id. at 956-57. The joint opinion also noted the possible argument that since Roe persons may have
organized their intimate relationships in reliance on the availability of abortion in the event that
contraception should fail. Id. at 856. However, this argument provides little additional support to
uphold Roe on reliance grounds, since that kind of reliance is not irreversible if, as Chief Justice
Rehnquist stated, reproductive planning could take virtually immediate account of this action. On
the reversibility of the reliance being an important fact in the reliance analysis, see supra note 36; R.
Kelso & C. Kelso, Dealing With Precedent, supra note 3, at 994-95.
39. 505 U.S. at 917 (Stevens, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part); id. at 929-34
(Blackmun, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part).
40. See id. at 927-28 (Blackmun, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part) ("[Clompelled
continuation of a pregnancy... impos[es] substantial physical intrusions and significant risks of
physical harm.... [M]otherhood has a dramatic impact on a woman's educational prospects,
employment opportunities, and self-determination ...."); Roe v. Wade, 410 U.S. 113, 153 (1973)
(Blackmun, J.) ("Maternity, or additional offspring, may force upon the woman a distressful life and
future. Psychological harm may be imminent. Mental and physical health may be taxed by child
care. There is also the distress, for all concerned ....").
41. Compare 505 U.S. at 934-40 (Blackmun, J.) (applying strict scrutiny to all of the legislative
regulations at issue in Casey) with id. at 879-901 (joint opinion in Casey) (applying rational review
to less than undue burdens on abortion choice; strict scrutiny applied only to the spousal notification
provision which was held to constitute an undue burden on abortion choice).
42. Note that it could be argued that the joint opinion in Casey summarily concluded that the
spousal notification provision was unconstitutional once it was held to be an undue burden. 505 U.S.
at 877 ("In our considered judgment, an undue burden is an unconstitutional burden."). However,
the better analysis of Casey is that when the joint opinion stated it was upholding the core holding of
Roe, that meant a court should apply Roe's strict scrutiny analysis to undue burdens on abortion
rights. Id. at 846, 869-71 The Court seems to apply the undue burden analysis in this way in other
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B. Theories of Precedent in Casey
In addition to disagreeing about sources of constitutional interpretation,
the opinions in Casey presented different theories of precedent. As
discussed in a previous article, those theories are:
(1) the instrumentalist focus: was the precedent wrongly decided?;- 3
(2) the formalist focus: follow precedent that is settled law, even if
wrongly decided;"
(3) the Holmesian focus: follow precedent that is substantially relied
upon, even if not settled law and wrongly decided; 5 and
(4) the natural law focus: follow precedent, even if not relied upon, not
settled law, and wrongly decided, unless some additional special
circumstances exist.46
For the natural law judge, these special circumstances can involve:
(1) the precedent is unworkable in practice;
(2) the precedent creates an inconsistency or incoherence in the law;
(3) a changed understanding of facts has undermined the precedent's
factual basis;
(4) the precedent represents a substantially wrong or substantially unjust
interpretation of the Constitution; or
(5) the precedent raises a concern about the Court's commitment to the
"Rule of Law." 7
unenumerated fundamental rights cases. For example, in cases involving the right to marry, the
Court has applied strict scrutiny to the significant infringement at issue in Zablocki v. Redhail, 434
U.S. 374 (1978), but only rational review to a burden on the right to marry of a prisoner, Turner v.
Safley, 482 U.S. 78 (1987). Similarly, the Court has applied strict scrutiny to significant burdens on
the right to travel, as in Shapiro v. Thompson, 394 U.S. 618 (1969) and Memorial Hospital v.
Maricopa County, 415 U.S. 250 (1974), while applying only rational review to other burdens on the
right to travel, as in Zobel v. Williams, 457 U.S. 55 (1982) and Hooper v. Bernalillo County
Assessor, 472 U.S. 612 (1985). For further discussion suggesting understanding the undue burden
analysis in this way, see R. Randall Kelso, Filling Gaps in the Supreme Court's Approach to the
Constitutional Review of Legislation: Standards, Ends, and Burdens Reconsidered, 33 S. TEx. L.
REV. 493, 510-12 (1992); R. Randall Kelso, Three Years Hence: An Update on Filling Gaps in the
Supreme Court's Approach to Constitutional Review of Legislation, 36 S. TEx. L. REV. 1, 9-11
(1995).
43. R. Kelso & C. Kelso, Dealing With Precedent, supra note 3, at 986-89.
44. Id. at 990-93 (citing, inter alia, Casey, 505 U.S. at 999 (1992) (Scalia, J., dissenting)
("Justices should do what is legally right by asking two questions: (1) Was Roe correctly decided?
(2) Has Roe succeeded in producing a settled body of law. If the answer to both questions is no, Roe
should undoubtedly be overruled.")).
45. Casey, 505 U.S. at 956 ("Any traditional notion of reliance is not applicable here [in
Casey)."); R. Kelso & C. Kelso, Dealing With Precedent, supra note 3 at 993-95 (citing, inter alia,
Payne v. Tennessee, 501 U.S. 808, 928 (1991) (Rehnquist, J.) ("Considerations in favor of stare
decisis are at their acme in cases... where reliance interests are involved.") On this reliance
inquiry, see supra notes 36, 38.
46. R. Kelso & C. Kelso, Dealing With Precedent, supra note 3 at 995-97 (citing, inter alia,
Casey, 505 U.S. at 855-69 (joint opinion)).
47. See id. at 995'1030 (1996) (discussing recent cases where these factors to overrule precedent
have been used by the Court). The factor regarding the "Rule of Law" involves such considerations
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The extent to which a judge commits to one of these theories of
precedent will naturally affect the weight given to prior judicial decisions.
In particular, natural law judges are likely to give the greatest weight to
precedent because they seek an additional special circumstance before
overruling precedent." Thus, in Casey, once Justice Scalia determined that
Roe was wrongly decided and not settled law, and in addition Chief Justice
Rehnquist decided that no substantial reliance existed upon Roe, Roe was
ripe for overruling. 9 In contrast, absent an additional special circumstance,
Justices O'Connor, Kennedy, and Souter concluded that their theory of
precedent called for the basic holding in Roe to be reaffirmed.0
III. POINTS OF STRESS IN THE COMMON LAW/NATURAL LAW THEORY
Predictably, Justices O'Connor, Kennedy, and Souter have continued to
vote together in a majority of cases decided after Casey. In cases decided by
a 5-4 margin, however, they have usually split." From considering these 5-4
opinions, it becomes clear that three main points of stress exist in applying
the natural law theory of interpretation. These points of stress help explain
the split in case results among Justices O'Connor, Kennedy and Souter when
as whether to follow the common-law practice that decisions are applied retroactively to all similar
cases pending on direct review, or whether to make the decision prospective only; whether the rule is
based not on proper legal argument, but as a response to political pressure, or whether the rule was
adopted without full briefing and argument on the issue. Id. at 1026-29.
48. See id. at 984-86, 995-96. One practical consequence of this is that those who would try to
persuade a natural law judge to overrule a precedent should do more than contend that the precedent
was wrongly decided. Reference should also be made to one or more of these "special
circumstances" for overruling precedent. And, as noted in a previous article, the current Court "has
reserved a finding of 'substantial error' almost exclusively for cases involving structural issues of
separation of powers, federalism, checks and balances or judicial review." Id. at 1037.
49. See e.g., supra notes 34, 44 and accompanying text (formalist approach); supra notes 38, 45
and accompanying text (Holmesian approach).
50. See Casey, 505 U.S. at 853 ("[T]he reservations any of us may have in reaffirming the central
holding of Roe are outweighed by the explication of individual liberty we have given combined with
the force of stare decisis."). Since they believed that Roe was rightly decided in its entirety, Justices
Blackmun and Stevens easily concluded that Roe should be followed in Casey. See supra note 39
and accompanying text.
51. Since Casey, Justices O'Connor, Kennedy, and Souter have split in 146 of the Court's 150 5-
4 cases. The exceptions are Rogers v. Tennessee, 532 U.S. 451 (2001); Camps
Newfoundland/Owatonna, Inc. v. Town of Harrison, 520 U.S. 564 (1997); BMW of North America
v. Gore, 517 U.S. 559 (1996); and Gustafson v. Alloyd Co., 513 U.S. 561 (1995), where they were in
the majority in each. As noted in the Introduction, every 5-4 opinion from the 1997-2000 Terms of
the Court, as well as selected 5-4 opinions from the 1992-96 Terms of the Court, are considered in
the rest of this article. See infra Appendix A (tabulating the split among the Justices in these 85
cases).
applying the natural law approach to different issues. These three points of
stress are the tension between:
(1) what the sources of interpretation suggest the meaning should be to a
natural law judge versus prior Supreme Court precedent (which may reflect
a formalist, Holmesian, or instrumentalist approach to the Constitution);
(2) whether the natural law judge adopts a classic/Christian natural law
approach or an Enlightenment/common law approach to interpreting the
Constitution; and
(3) whether the natural law judge has leanings in the direction of
adopting formalist, Holmesian, or instrumentalist results in some
circumstances, which may affect the reasoning and outcome in a particular
case.
A. Sources of Constitutional Law Versus Precedent
In any case, it is possible there will be a tension between what the
sources of constitutional law other than precedent suggest the answer should
be to a constitutional issue, and what the Supreme Court's precedents hold.
Given the great respect natural law judges pay to precedent, 2 this tension
between sources and precedent is most acute for a natural law judge. This is
particularly likely to occur for a precedent whose majority was made up of
formalist Justices (1873-1937), Holmesian Justices (1937-54), or
instrumentalist-era Justices (1954-1986). In such a case, the precedent may
not reflect how a natural law judge would interpret the Constitution (the
original natural law era on the Court being 1789-1872), making it more
likely that a tension may exist between sources and precedent."
The clearest recent examples of this tension between what the sources of
constitutional law suggest and judicial precedents arose in United States v.
Lopez54 and United States v. Morrison.55 As Justices Kennedy and O'Connor
indicated in their concurrence in Lopez, using constitutional law sources
rather than precedent suggests that Congress overstepped its bounds when it
passed the Gun-Free School Zones Act of 1990, relying on the Commerce
Clause.56 Here, "neither the actors nor their conduct has a commercial
character, and neither the purposes nor the design of the statute has an
evident commercial nexus."57 This is further supported by arguments about
52. See supra notes 46-48 and accompanying text.
53. On the Supreme Court, majorities typically followed these theories of interpretation in these
years. See R. Kelso, Styles of Constitutional Interpretation, supra note 2, at 184-225. See also R.
Kelso, Separation of Powers, supra note 4, at 552-63 (discussing more broadly the ages of American
law in terms of natural law, formalist, Holmesian, and instrumentalist eras).
54. 514 U.S. 549 (1995).
55. 529 U.S. 598 (2000).
56. Lopez, 514 U.S. at 580 (Kennedy, J., concurring).
57. Id.
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federalism embedded in the structure of our Constitution, " and the fact that
"it is well established that education is a traditional concern of the States." 59
Nonetheless, as Justices Kennedy and O'Connor pointed out, "Stare decisis
operates with great force in counseling us not to call in question the essential
principles now in place respecting the congressional power to regulate
transactions of a commercial nature."6  Thus, Kennedy and O'Connor
"join[ed] the Court's opinion with... observations on what [we] conceive to
be its necessary though limited holding."6
In his dissent in Lopez, Justice Souter gave even greater respect to
precedent than did Justices O'Connor and Kennedy.62 As Justice Souter
observed, for the last fifty years the Court has deferred to rationally based
congressional judgments regarding whether Congress was regulating an
activity affecting interstate commerce.6' Applying that deferential standard
here would lead to a conclusion that Congress' exercise of power should be
upheld, despite the reservations one might have from text, structure, and
history arguments alone.' 4
On balance, one can say that a judge might have a strong natural law
view of precedent, a medium natural law view, or a weak natural law view. 5
In Lopez, Justice Souter adopted a strong natural law view of precedent,
following the instrumentalist-era precedents which give virtual plenary
power to Congress to regulate under the Commerce Clause, which is a
broader power than a natural law judge would be likely to find absent those
precedents.' In Lopez, Justices Kennedy and O'Connor held a medium
58. Id. at 576 ("The theory that two governments accord more liberty than one requires ... two
distinct and discernable lines of political accountability: one between the citizens and the Federal
Government; the second between the citizens and the States.").
59. Id. at 580.
60. Id. at 574. Thus, as their concurrence indicated, "deference given to Congress has since been
confirmed," and decisions should not be "called into question" when extending the Commerce
Clause to uphold civil rights laws with an economic nexus, such as Katzenbach v. McClung, 379
U.S. 294 (1964) (banning racial discrimination at public restaurants), or criminal laws with an
economic nexus, such as Perez v. United States, 402 U.S. 146 (1971) (extortionate credit
transactions). Lopez, 514 U.S. at 573-74.
61. Id.at568.
62. See id. at 603 (Souter, J. dissenting).
63. Id. at 603-04, 608.
64. Id. at 604-07, 614-15 (expressing concern about abandoning recent consensus in Commerce
Clause cases).
65. In addition, of course, are the weaker views of precedent of Holmesian, formalist, and
instrumentalist decisionmaking styles. See supra notes 43-45 and accompanying text.
66. For example, while Chief Justice Marshall's opinion in Gibbons v. Ogden, 22 U.S. (9
Wheat.) 1 (1824), gave the federal government wide power to regulate under the Commerce Clause,
it is clear that Marshall assumed that there were some activities "which are completely within a
particular State, which do not affect other States, and with which it is not necessary to interfere, for
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natural law view of precedent, balancing the precedents against the other
sources. 
67
The same split between Justice Souter and Justices O'Connor and
Kennedy occurred in United States v. Morrison.6 ' Again, Justice Souter
followed the instrumentalist-era precedents, whose reasoning permits
Congress to regulate any activity under the Commerce Clause that has a
significant effect on interstate commerce. Based upon congressional
findings regarding the economic impact of violence against women, Justice
Souter supported congressional power to pass the Violence Against Women
Act of 1994.69 Once again, Justices O'Connor and Kennedy took a medium
approach to precedent, following the core holdings of the instrumentalist-era
cases, which upheld the power of Congress to ban economic criminal
activity, as in Perez," but concluding that regulation of noneconomic,
criminal conduct, an issue not directly before the Court in the
instrumentalist-era cases, could not be justified under Congress' Commerce
Clause power.7 Further, note that this approach is not as deferential to state
governments as a Holmesian deference to government approach.72
the purpose of executing some of the general powers of the government." Id. at 195. With over
forty states already having criminal laws outlawing possession of firearms around schools, including
Texas where the case arose, Lopez is a classic case where no federal interference is necessary.
Lopez, 514 U.S. at 551, 581. Of course, from a natural law perspective, it is appropriate to follow a
pattern of precedents as part of reasoned elaboration of the law even if those precedents lead to a
different result today than would have been reached two-hundred years ago. See supra note 22.
And, because of the force of precedent, it is appropriate to follow precedent even if one disagrees
with the precedent's analysis of the text, structure, history, and practice, unless some special
circumstance suggests the precedent should be overruled. See supra note 47. During his
confirmation hearing, Justice Souter indicated that while on the New Hampshire Supreme Court he
had voted to uphold precedents with which he disagreed and that the rule that the Court should
ordinarily adhere to its precedents "is a bedrock necessity if we are going to have in our judicial
systems anything that can be called the rule of law." Linda Greenhouse, Defining Souter, Some,
N.Y. TIMES, Sept. 18, 1991, at A16. See also Liang Kan, Comment, A Theory of Justice Sourer, 45
EMORY L. REV. 1373, 1383-1417 (1996) (discussing Justice Souter's decision-making under the
heading, "Justice Souter's Response: Stick to Precedent").
67. See supra text accompanying notes 56-60.
68. 529 U.S. 598 (2000).
69. Id. at 634 (Souter, J., dissenting).
70. See supra note 60.
71. Morrison, 529 U.S. at 601, 610. Even if there had been an instrumentalist-era case on point,
Justice O'Connor and Kennedy probably would have called for that case to be overruled, based on
the "special circumstance" that such a case would be "substantially wrong," see supra text
accompanying note 47, a conclusion that Justice Kennedy and O'Connor have reserved almost
exclusively for cases involving the structural issues of separation of powers, federalism, checks and
balances, and judicial review. See R. Kelso & C. Kelso, Dealing With Precedent, supra note 3, at
1008-25, 1037. Similar to Justice Marshall in Gibbons v. Ogden, for Justices O'Connor and
Kennedy, the "Constitution requires a distinction between what is truly national and truly local."
529 U.S. at 617-18. See supra note 64. For a similar split among Justices O'Connor, Kennedy, and
Souter in a statutory interpretation case, see Solid Waste Agency of N. Cook County v. United States
Army Corps of Eng., 531 U.S. 159, 167-72 (2001) (showing that because of constitutional concerns
regarding the extent of Congress' Commerce Clause power, Justices O'Connor and Kennedy joined
the majority opinion which held as a matter of statutory interpretation that the Clean Water Act does
654
[Vol. 29: 637, 2002] Swing Votes on the Current Supreme Court
PEPPERDINE LAW REVIEW
A similar difference between Justices O'Connor and Kennedy versus
Justice Souter also appears in cases involving the criminal justice system.
Typically, where these three Justices disagree in criminal cases, it is because
Justice Souter has chosen, as in Lopez and Morrison, to follow the broader
reasoning of instrumentalist-era precedents, which is more favorable to
criminal defendants' rights. In contrast, Justices O'Connor and Kennedy,
while not overruling the core holdings of those cases, have found a way, as
in Lopez and Morrison, to distinguish the prior cases and reach a result more
consistent with their understanding of constitutional text, purpose, structure,
history, and practice, which is often more favorable to the government.
For example, in Pennsylvania Board of Probation and Parole v. Scott,73
the Supreme Court was faced with the question of whether to apply the
exclusionary rule to bar the introduction at parole revocation hearings of
evidence seized in violation of the parolees' Fourth Amendment rights.
Dissenting with Justices Ginsburg and Breyer, Justice Souter argued that the
deterrent function of the exclusionary rule is implicated just as much in a
parole revocation proceeding as in a criminal trial.74 Thus, the reasoning of
not apply to an isolated sand and gravel pit in Northern Illinois which provides a habitat for
migratory birds); id. at 4052-58 (Stevens, J., dissenting) (joining because he did not share these
constitutional concerns, Justice Souter joined the Stevens dissent which held that the Clean Water
Act did apply to this pit). On the other hand, as Justices O'Connor and Kennedy have noted, their
approach does not adopt the static view of the Constitution propounded by formalist judges. See
supra note 22. Thus, as they have noted,
The Federal Government undertakes activities today that would have been unimaginable
to the Framers in two senses: first, because the Framers would not have conceived that
any government would conduct such activities; and second, because the Framers would
not have believed that the Federal Government, rather than the States, would assume such
responsibilities. Yet the powers conferred upon the Federal Government by the
Constitution were phrased in language broad enough to allow for the expansion of the
Federal Government's role.
Lopez, 514 U.S. at 574-75 (Kennedy, J., concurring) (citing New York v. United States, 505 U.S.
144, 157 (1992)).
72. See Earl M. Maltz, Justice Kennedy's Vision of Federalism, 31 RUTGERS L.J. 761 (2000)
(criticizing Justice Kennedy on the grounds that his theory of federalism is not as deferential to state
governments as Chief Justice Rehnquist's approach). As discussed by Justice Kennedy in his
concurrence in U.S. Term Limits, Inc. v. Thornton, 514 U.S. 779, 838 (1995), the framers and
ratifiers adopted a dual theory of sovereignty, "establishing two orders of government, each with its
own direct relationship, its own privity, and its own set of mutual rights and obligations to the people
who sustain it and are governed by it." As Justice Kennedy noted, id. at 839-41, this theory was
emphatically embraced by the Supreme Court, per Justice Marshall, in the famous case of
McCulloch v. Maryland, 17 U.S. (4 Wheat.) 316, 403-05 (1819). For why Justice O'Connor might
have joined Chief Justice Rehnquist's more Holmesian dissent in Thornton, despite her usually
adopting a natural law theory of interpretation, see infra notes 126-30, 135, 137 and accompanying
text.
73. 524 U.S. 357 (1998).
74. Id. at 370 (Souter, J. dissenting).
prior Court precedents applying the exclusionary rule to criminal trials
despite the loss of potentially reliable evidence should be extended to apply
the exclusionary rule to parole revocation hearings.75 In contrast, Justices
O'Connor and Kennedy joined Justice Thomas' majority opinion which
noted that no prior precedent had explicitly addressed the applicability of the
exclusionary rule to parole revocation hearings, and that in terms of
structural arguments regarding our federal system the Court has "long been
adverse to imposing federal requirements upon the parole systems of the
States.""
A similar split among Justices O'Connor, Kennedy, and Souter occurred
in Ramdass v. Angelone." At issue in Ramdass was whether to extend
Justice Blackmun's opinion in Simmons v. South Carolina."8 Simmons held
that where the State puts the defendant's future dangerousness at issue in a
death penalty case, due process requires the jury to be informed if a life
sentence would be without the possibility of parole. In Ramdass, the
defendant had not yet become parole ineligible because a separate court had
not yet entered judgment on a jury's verdict which would make the
defendant parole ineligible." With Justices Ginsburg and Breyer, Justice
Souter joined Justice Stevens' dissent, which argued the "acute unfairness in
permitting a State to rely on a recent conviction to establish a defendant's
future dangerousness while simultaneously permitting the State to deny that
there was such a conviction when the defendant attempts to argue that he is
parole ineligible" and that "[e]ven the most miserly reading of the opinions
in Simmons" supports the defendant's argument in this case. 0 In contrast,
the majority noted that technically the defendant was not parole ineligible at
the time the jury instruction was given, and thus the Simmons precedent did
not directly govern resolution of the case. Structural arguments suggested to
75. Id. As Justice Souter noted, cases involving the ordinary administration of the criminal law,
such as criminal trials or parole hearings, implicate different kinds of concerns than noncriminal
cases, such as civil tax proceedings or deportation proceedings, or specialized kinds of criminal
proceedings, such as habeas petitions or grand jury proceedings. Thus, it is understandable that in
these other contexts the Court's precedents had held that the benefits of the exclusionary rule "would
be so marginal as to be outweighed by the incremental costs." Id. at 371-72. In contrast,
[A] revocation proceeding often serves the same function as a criminal trial, and the
revocation hearing may very well present the only forum in which the State will seek to
use evidence of a parole violation, even when that evidence would support an
independent criminal charge. The deterrent function of the exclusionary rule is therefore
implicated as much by a revocation proceeding as by a conventional trial....
Id. at 370. In a stronger instrumentalist dissent, Justice Stevens urged the Court to adopt the view
that the exclusionary rule is constitutionally required, and thus no balancing of the value of its
deterrent effect versus the loss of reliable evidence need be done. Id. at 369-70 (Stevens, J.,
dissenting).
76. Id. at 369.
77. 530 U.S. 156 (2000).
78. 512 U.S. 154(1994).
79. 530 U.S. at 178-79.
80. Id. at 182 (Stevens, J., dissenting).
[Vol. 29: 637, 2002] Swing Votes on the Current Supreme Court
PEPPERDINE LAW REVIEW
the majority that "state trial judges and appellate courts [should] remain free,
of course, to experiment," and thus this aspect of criminal procedure should
not be imposed on all fifty states as a constitutional requirement.'
This split among Justices O'Connor, Kennedy, and Souter, with Justice
Souter remaining more faithful to the reasoning of instrumentalist-era
precedents, and Justices O'Connor and Kennedy more faithful to their
understanding of text, purpose, structure, history, and practice, appears in
case after case involving the criminal justice system, both in non-death
penalty cases like Scott"2 and in cases involving the death penalty like
Ramdass."3 Of course, in cases where there are no clear precedents on point,
or in cases where the instrumentalist precedents should be overruled
consistent with even a strong natural law approach to precedent, Justice
Souter has been willing to join Justices O'Connor and Kennedy and reach a
result consistent with a natural law approach to the other sources of
constitutional interpretation: text, purpose, structure, history, and practice. '
81. id. at 171, 177-78. The majority did note that Virginia has now amended their procedures to
permit a Simmons instruction to be given on the Ramdass facts. Id. at 178.
82. See, e.g., Texas v. Cobb, 532 U.S. 162 (2001) (considering whether the follow the
Blockbuster test which holds that the Sixth Amendment right to counsel attaches only to charged
offenses, or offenses that even if not charged would be considered the same offense; dissent follows
instrumentalist-era precedents in the Courts of Appeals and state courts to hold that the Sixth
Amendment right also attaches to criminal acts that are "closely related to" or "inextricably
intertwined with" the particular crime charged); Ohler v. United States, 529 U.S. 753 (2000)
(considering how to apply the instrumentalist-era Luce exception governing waiving the right to
appeal an in limine ruling that a prior conviction is admissible as character evidence or for
impeachment purposes); Smith v. Robbins, 528 U.S. 259 (2000) (considering application of the
instrumentalist-era Wende brief procedure for an indigent appeal of a criminal conviction); Illinois v.
Wardlow, 528 U.S. 119 (2000) (considering the constitutionality of a warrantless investigatory stop
under the instrumentalist-era Terry case); Calderon v. Coleman, 525 U.S. 114 (1998) (considering
how to apply the instrumentalist-era Brecht test in habeas proceedings). See also Daniels v. United
States, 532 U.S. 374 (2001) (holding that federal post-conviction relief is not available to a prisoner
through a motion to vacate on the ground that the current sentence was enhanced based upon an
allegedly unconstitutional prior conviction for which the petitioner is no longer in custody);
Lackawanna Cty. Dist. Att. v. Coss, 532 U.S. 394 (2001) (finding that federal post-conviction relief
is similarly not available through a petition for a writ of habeas corpus).
83. See, e.g., Weeks v. Angelone, 528 U.S. 225 (2000) (holding that a jury verdict of death
cannot be set aside by a slight possibility, rather than reasonable likelihood, that the jury felt
compelled by the jury instructions not to consider mitigating evidence); Jones v. United States, 527
U.S. 373 (1999) (unwilling to impose in a death penalty case a constitutional requirement that a trial
judge must instruct the jury as to the legal consequence of jury deadlock); Calderon v. Thompson,
523 U.S. 538 (1998) (considering whether the Ninth Circuit abused its discretion in ordering a
belated en banc vote on a death penalty case when two judges, because of administrative mistakes,
did not request an en banc vote in a timely manner; Supreme Court majority holds that granting the
habeas petition to ensure that the votes of all the judges are counted would be an abuse of
discretion).
84. See, e.g., Atwater v. City of Lago Vista, 532 U.S. 318 (2001) (holding that traditional
common-law history and more recent legislative and executive practice support the view that it is
constitutional for the police to make a warrantless arrest for a minor criminal offense, such as a
misdemeanor seat-belt violation punishable only by a fine; Justice O'Connor, departing from her
usual voting pattern, joined Justice Stevens, Ginsburg, and Breyer in dissent, concluding that under
instrumentalist-era precedents such an arrest would be "unreasonable" and thus in violation of the
Fourth Amendment); Hopkins v. Reeves, 524 U.S. 88 (1998) (Stevens, J. dissenting) (arguing that
state trial courts, in capital cases, are not constitutionally required to instruct juries on offenses that
are not lesser-included offenses; instrumentalist Justice Stevens dissenting); United States v.
Scheffer, 523 U.S. 303 (1998) (Stevens, J. dissenting) (arguing that the rule against admission of
polygraph evidence in a court martial proceeding does not violate Fifth or Sixth Amendment rights
of the accused to present a defense; instrumentalist Justice Stevens dissenting).
Of course, in cases where a natural law approach would differ from a formalist approach-
often because the natural law approach weighs arguments of a text's purpose more strongly than the
formalist approach, which focuses more on literal interpretation of text, see supra notes 18-20, 23-
24, 30 and accompanying text, Justices O'Connor, Kennedy, and Souter usually can be found on
one side of the opinion, and Justices Scalia and Thomas can be found on the other side. See, e.g.,
Stewart v. Martinez-Villareal, 523 U.S. 637, 643-44 (1998) (finding petitioner's claim raised for a
second time, after the first claim was dismissed as not ripe for resolution, was not a "second"
application under the Antiterrorism and Effective Death Penalty Act because the first application
was not heard on the merits; following a literal approach would produce a "perverse" result);
Bousley v. United States, 523 U.S. 614, 623-24 (1998) (explaining that petitioner who can make a
showing of actual innocence entitled to have his defaulted claim of an unintelligent plea considered
on the merits, despite the fact that the claim was literally defaulted). The greater respect for
precedent in the natural law approach than in the formalist approach can also cause disagreements in
case results. See supra notes 43-50 and accompanying text. See, e.g., Dickerson v. United States,
530 U.S. 428, 443 (Scalia, J. dissenting) (2000) (arguing that principles of stare decisis weigh
heavily against overruling Miranda); Harmelin v. Michigan, 501 U.S. 957, 996-1001 (1991)
(Kennedy, J., concurring in part and concurring in the judgment) (arguing that principles of stare
decisis counsel the Court to follow its precedents and apply a proportionality principle as part of
determining what is "cruel and unusual punishment" under the Eighth Amendment; Justice Scalia's
emphasis on literal text and specific intent leads him to conclude that the framers and ratifiers
rejected any proportionality requirement under the Eighth Amendment, and thus later Supreme
Court cases adopting that requirement, like Solem v. Helm, 463 U.S. 277 (1983), should be
overruled).
The same split between the natural law approach's greater focus on purpose, versus the
formalist greater focus on literal meaning, was also evident in Rogers v. Tennessee, 532 U.S. 451
(2001). There, for the Court, Justice O'Connor held that the purpose behind the Ex Post Facto
Clause and Due Process Clause to assure "fair warning as those concepts bear on the
constitutionality of attaching criminal penalties to what previously had been innocent conduct"
would not be violated by permitting the Tennessee Supreme Court to abolish retroactively the
common law "year and a day rule." Id. at 1698-99. In dissent, Justice Scalia noted that literally this
result permitted the Court to approve "the conviction of a man for murder that was not murder (but
only manslaughter) when the offense was committed." Id. Justice Scalia's dissent was joined not
only by Justice Thomas, but also by Justices Stevens and Breyer, in part, as their separate dissents
point out, because of instrumentalist social policy reasons that "the majority has undervalued the
threat to liberty that is posed whenever the criminal law is changed retroactively," id. at 1703
(Stevens, J., dissenting), and by failing to consider "'considerations of convenience, of utility, and of
the deepest sentiments of justice."' Id. at 1710 (Breyer, J, dissenting) (citing BENJAMIN CARDOZO,
THE NATURE OF THE JUDICIAL PROCESS 148-49 (1921)). Formalist and instrumentalist-leaning
Justices also joined forces in Kyllo v. United States, 533 U.S. 27 (2001), where Justice Scalia, joined
by Justices Souter, Thomas, Ginsburg, and Breyer, concluded that thermal imaging aimed at a
private home to detect relative amounts of heat was an unconstitutional search within the meaning of
the Fourth Amendment. In dissent, Justices Stevens, joined by Chief Justice Rehnquist and Justices
O'Connor and Kennedy, concluded that the thermal imaging was aimed at a house in plain view, and
thus the plain view exception to the Fourth Amendment should be applied to the case. Id. at 2047-
48.
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B. Classic/Christian Natural Law v. Enlightenment Natural Law/Common
Law
A second reason that leads to different results among Justices O'Connor,
Kennedy, and Souter is a different substantive understanding of which
natural law tradition most affected the framing and ratifying of the
Constitution. Naturally, a judge will view the text, purpose, structure, and
history of the Constitution differently depending on which natural law view
the judge believes the framers and ratifiers held.
In general, there were two competing natural law approaches in the
Eighteenth century to which the framers and ratifiers turned for guidance.
One approach was the classic/Christian natural law tradition, that developed
from Aristotle, through Aquinas, and affected such writers as Hooker and
Burke." This tradition is what many writers think of when they use the term
"natural law," that law being an emanation of God's reason and will, and is
reflected in the views of William Blackstone and some of the early
Federalist Justices on the Supreme Court, including Justice Samuel Chase.86
The second tradition is the Enlightenment natural law tradition of the
English, Scottish, and French Enlightenments.87 Under this social contract
approach, rights derive from man and man's reason. In the Anglo-American
context, rights emerge from the common-law process of judicial, legislative,
85. See generally R. Randall Kelso, The Natural Law Tradition on the Modem Supreme Court:
Not Burke, but the Enlightenment Tradition Represented by Locke, Madison, and Marshall, 26 ST.
MARY'S L.J. 1051, 1053-55 (1995) [hereinafter R. Kelso, Natural Law Tradition] (comparing the
two competing natural law traditions).
86. Id. at 1054-55. Of course, the classic natural law approach of Aristotle and the Christian
natural law approach of Aquinas and subsequent writers are not identical in every respect. For
example, Aristotle approved of slavery, while the Christian natural law tradition, in its best moments
(as opposed to being an apologist for European colonialization during the Sixteenth and Seventeenth
centuries), has forcefully rejected that. See generally M. STANTON EVANS, THE THEME IS
FREEDOM: RELIGION, POLITICS AND THE AMERICAN TRADITION 133-48 (1994).
On balance, however, there is a clear distinction between a natural law tradition resting on
Aristotelian and Thomist foundations, and the Enlightenment tradition of the English, Scottish, and
French Enlightenments. See R. Kelso, Natural Law Tradition, supra note 85, at 1053-56, 1067-73.
Similarly, while there are naturally differences between Protestant and Catholic natural law
traditions, see, e.g., Joseph L. Sax, Takings and the Police Power, 74 YALE L.J. 36, 55-57 (1964)
(discussing the Catholic natural law concept of the "just price", which differs from the Protestant's
tradition greater acceptance of market capitalism), and differences among Protestant traditions
themselves, when compared to the Enlightenment philosophic traditions, all of these other
religiously grounded traditions fall on the classic/Christian, not the Enlightenment, side of the
divide.
87. This tradition includes such writers as Hobbes, Locke, and Berkeley of the English
Enlightenment; Hutchenson, Hume, and Adam Smith of the Scottish Enlightenment; and
Montesquieu, Rousseau, and Voltaire of the French Enlightenment. See generally R. Kelso, Natural
Law Tradition, supra note 85, at 1055-56.
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and executive interaction. This is often called the "natural rights" or
"common law" approach."
The Supreme Court in the recent case of Alden v. Maine addressed the
difference between these two traditions in terms of case outcomes. 9 This
case involved the question of what sovereign immunity rights states were
intended to have upon entering into the Constitutional system of governance.
As discussed in Justice Souter's opinion, there were two eighteenth century
theories of sovereignty, what Souter called the "natural law" approach
(reflecting the classic/Christian natural law tradition), and what Souter called
the "common law" approach (reflecting the Enlightenment social
contract/common law tradition).' The classic/Christian natural law tradition
88. While, analytically, one can draw a distinction between a "natural rights" approach based
upon deducing principles of justice from an application of "reason," and a "common law" approach
grounded in judicial elaboration of societal "custom," in the Eighteenth century writers and scholars
often confused "custom" and "reason," and thus for them, a natural law approach toward "reason"
was consistent with the "common law" methodology which emphasized "custom." See generally
James Q. Whitman, Why Did the Revolutionary Lawyers Confuse Custom and Reason?, 58 U. CHI.
L. REV. 1321 (1991) (discussing the synthesis of "natural law" and "common law" in revolutionary
era legal writings). Thus, though distinct in our understanding today, it is accurate to place
"common law" and Enlightenment "natural rights" on one side of the Eighteenth century natural law
debates, and the classic/Christian natural law tradition on the other side. Similarly, though
differences exist among the English, Scottish and French Enlightenment traditions, and between
these traditions and the Civic Republican tradition of James Harrington and others, for purposes of
this discussion, all these traditions fall broadly on one side of a divide, and the classic/Christian
tradition falls on the other side. See generally R. Kelso, Natural Law Tradition, supra note 85, at
1074 n.75-76 (contrasting classical/Christian tradition with the Humanist tradition). The "humanist"
continental natural law writers of the Seventeenth and Eighteenth centuries, such as Pufendorf,
Burlamanqui, and Vattel, also fall on the Enlightenment, rather than the classic/Christian, side of the
divide. Id.
89. 527 U.S. 706 (1999). As we noted in a previous article, the difference between these two
approaches in terms of political philosophy was reflected at the founding by the difference between
the Federalist Party, which "drew much of their political philosophy from the classic and Christian
natural law tradition, which in its English version was represented by Hooker, Blackstone, and
Burke," versus Thomas Jefferson's Republican Party, which "was billed more as the party of the
working man, and had its philosophical roots in the Enlightenment natural law tradition." Charles D.
Kelso & R. Randall Kelso, Politics and the Constitution: A Review of Judge Malcolm Wilkey's Call
for a Second Constitutional Convention, 27 PAC. L.J. 1213, 1228 (1996). More broadly, one can
note that as a philosophic matter, the "Enlightenment project emphasized four central goals of
liberalism: 'civil peace, material prosperity through economic growth, scientific progress, and
rational liberty."' R. Kelso, Natural Law Tradition, supra note 85, at 1065 (citing ROGERS M.
SMITH, LIBERALISM AND AMERICAN CONSTITUTIONAL LAW 116-19 (1985)). In contrast,
[T]he natural law principles that flow from Burke, Blackstone, and others in the
eighteenth-century classical and Christian natural law tradition are more elitist,
aristocratic, and conservative.... [A]s Professor Presser has noted, "The conservatives,
as would Burke in 1791, conceived of the state as an organic entity, with hierarchical
control, and a single set of correct answers to political problems to be elaborated and
pronounced from the top down. Sovereignty in England, in other words, rested not in the
people but in the 'holy trinity' of crown, lords, and commons."
R. Kelso, Natural Law Tradition, supra note 85, at 1066 (citing STEPHEN B. PRESSER, THE
ORIGINAL MISUNDERSTANDING: THE ENGLISH, THE AMERICANS, AND THE DIALECTICS OF
FEDERALIST JURISPRUDENCE 51 (1991)).
90. Alden, 527 U.S. at 760-61 (Souter, J., dissenting).
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adopts a strong theory of sovereign immunity, based upon the King, or Pope,
as sovereign, and thus not subject to suit without consent.9' The fully
developed Enlightenment theory of the social contract rests sovereignty on
common law grounds, which can be limited by later enacted statutes.92
However, some early Enlightenment thinking, like that of Hobbes or Locke,
though rejecting the metaphysics of the classic/Christian tradition, clearly
adopted strong state sovereign immunity notions.93
Looking over the historical evidence, both at the time of ratification, and
legislative, executive and judicial practice soon thereafter, Justice Souter
concluded that the framers and ratifiers of the Constitution had more in mind
than the common law approach, based upon a strong social
contract/Enlightenment/common law commitment to natural law.94 And, as
Justice Souter noted, this approach to sovereign immunity reflects an
analytically consistent approach which meshes well with a range of
background natural law principles, like "where there is a right, there must be
a remedy."95
On the other hand, there is a significant amount of evidence, cited by
Justice Kennedy in his opinion for the Court, supporting the view that on
this issue of state sovereign immunity the framers and ratifiers of both the
original Constitution, and the later Eleventh Amendment, had more in mind
the classic/Christian natural law approach. And, as even Justice Souter
acknowledged, this is consistent with Hobbes and Locke's early
Enlightenment natural law approach, and reflects statements made by
Alexander Hamilton, James Madison, and John Marshall during the
91. Id.at764-68.
92. Id. at 768-72.
93. Thus, as Justice Souter noted, while certain Seventeenth century Enlightenment thinkers, like
Hobbes and Locke, rejected religious grounding for natural law, and placed rights in the secular
concept of the consent of the governed, they nonetheless retained in their writing the strong theory of
state sovereign immunity typical of the classic/Christian natural law tradition. See id. at 767 n.6.
Only in the Eighteenth century, with more fully developed Enlightenment political philosophy of
Montesquieu and others regarding separation of powers and checks and balances, did the full
common law approach to sovereignty emerge. Id. at 768-72. Thus, Hobbes or Locke do not reflect
the well-developed Enlightenment position on sovereign immunity.
94. Id. at 772-94.
95. See id. at 810-14. Note that respect for the principle that "there must be a remedy" appears
even in the approach to immunity developed by Justice Kennedy. See infra notes 96-99 and
accompanying text. As Justice Kennedy stated in Alden v. Maine, "In ratifying the Constitution, the
States consented to suits brought by other States or by the Federal Government ... [and] Congress
may authorize private suits against non-consenting States pursuant to its § 5 enforcement power."
Id. at 755-56. And, of course, individuals can bring private actions for injunctive relief as authorized
under Ex Parte Young, 209 U.S. 123 (1908).
96. Id. at 715-24.
ratification debates.97 Thus, a Justice viewing the framers and ratifiers as
holding a balanced view between classic/Christian versus
Enlightenment/common law approaches would likely adopt this approach.98
With regard to the other decision-making styles, formalists and Holmesian
judges are likely to adopt a strong theory of state sovereign immunity
because they adopt positivist theories of law where the law's force derives
from the will of the sovereign, which can consent to being sued or not.99This
split between Justices Kennedy and Souter has been played out in a
sequence of cases involving the Eleventh Amendment and related issues of
state sovereign immunity over the past few years."
97. Id. at 767 n.6, 773-75, 800.
98. Note that the focus of this analysis is not on which natural law approach, if any, the Justices
believe is most valid. The relevant question is what was the natural law approach favored by the
framers and ratifiers of the Constitution and the Eleventh Amendment. Thus, as Justice Kennedy
noted, "[Tihe contours of sovereign immunity are determined by the founders' understanding, not by
the principles or limitations derived from natural law." Id. at 734. In this regard, note that
regardless of whether individual framers and ratifiers adopted an Enlightenment/ common law
approach or a classic/Christian approach, like that of Edmund Burke, both reject the formalist
emphasis, see supra text accompanying note 30, on a "static" Constitution and "specific intent." In
contrast, both adopt the view of a "living" Constitution, see supra note 22, with great judicial
faithfulness to precedent, and to considering not only "specific" intent, but also the "general" intent
or principles behind constitutional provisions. See generally R. Kelso, Natural Law Tradition, supra
note 85, at 1057-64 (citing, inter alia, Ernest Young, Rediscovering Conservatism: Burkean Political
Theory and Constitutional Interpretation, 72 N.C. L. REV. 619 (1994)). See also Farber, supra note
22, at 189 n.93 ("Although the idea of an evolving constitutional regime is often considered liberal,
it can also be defended as the truest embodiment of conservatism."), citing Young, supra.
99. See generally R. Kelso, Separation of Powers, supra note 4, at 535-45. Thus, as Justice
Souter noted in Alden, "Justice Holmes said so expressly: 'A sovereign is exempt from suit, not
because of any formal conception or obsolete [natural law] theory, but on the logical and practical
ground that there can be no legal right as against the authority that makes the law on which the right
depends."' 527 U.S. at 796. On the other hand, the instrumentalist preference for protecting rights of
individuals against the state, see R. Kelso, Styles of Constitutional Interpretation, supra note 2, at
221-25, means that the instrumentalist position is to give a limited reading to the Eleventh
Amendment and related theories of sovereign immunity. See, e.g., Seminole Tribe of Fla. v. Florida,
517 U.S. 44, 76 (1996) (Stevens, J. dissenting); Atascadero State Hosp. v. Scanlon, 473 U.S. 234,
247 (1985) (Brennan, J., joined by Marshall, J., Blackmun, J., & Stevens, J., dissenting); Pennhurst
State Sch. & Hosp. v. Halderman, 465 U.S. 890, 126 (1984) (Stevens, J., joined by Brennan, J.,
Marshall, J., & Blackmun, J., dissenting).
100. See Bd. of Trustees of the Univ. of Ala. v. Garrett, 530 U.S. 1303 (2001); Kimel v. Fla. Bd.
of Regents, 528 U.S. 62 (2000); Coll. Sav. Bank v. Fla. Prepaid Postsecondary Educ. Expense Bd.,
527 U.S. 666 (1999); Seminole Tribe v. Florida, 517 U.S. 44 (1996). Note that in each of these
cases Justice O'Connor has joined with Justice Kennedy to form a 5-Justice majority for his views.
As discussed with regard to the Establishment and Takings Clauses (see infra text accompanying
notes 100-104 and 106-116) Justice O'Connor's voting pattern is consistent with the view that the
framers and ratifiers adopted an Enlightenment/common law approach towards natural law,
particularly its earlier Lockean form, rather than a balanced classic/Christian versus
Enlightenment/common law approach. Since Justice Kennedy's approach toward state sovereign
immunity is consistent with the early Enlightenment doctrines of Hobbes and Locke, and with
statements made during the ratification debates by Hamilton, Madison, and Marshall (see supra text
accompanying notes 97-98) it is not surprising that a judge, like Justice O'Connor, committed to the
Enlightenment/common law vision, particularly in its Lockean aspects, would join with Justice
Kennedy in these cases.
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Views about the Establishment Clause also reflect variations in a natural
law approach to the Constitution. The Enlightenment/common law view is
reflected in Jefferson's famous reference to a "wall of separation between
church and State,"'0 ' and in the views of James Madison and others at the
beginning of our constitutional history that official endorsement of religion
can impair religious liberty." This approach underlays Justice O'Connor
and Souter's adoption in Lee v. Weisman"3 of the endorsement test to
determine violations of the Establishment Clause. A recent application of
this approach to the Establishment Clause occurred in the case of Santa Fe
Independent School District v. Doe."4 The classic/Christian natural law
tradition would naturally be much more accommodating to expressions of
religious faith, concluding, as perhaps did Justice Story, that "government
could promote a generalized or nondenominational Christianity, so long as it
did so in a manner that tolerated non-Christian religions."'' °  A Justice
101. See Lee v. Weisman, 505 U.S. 577, 600-01 (1992) (Blackmun, J., concurring).
102. See id. at 612-26 (Souter, J., concurring). See generally Douglas Laycock, Non-Preferential
Aid to Religion: A False Claim About Original Intent, 27 WM. & MARY L. REV. 875 (1986)
(examining the meaning of the establishment clause).
103. 505 U.S. at 612-26 (Souter, J., concurring). On the endorsement inquiry in general, see R.
Kelso, Natural Law Tradition, supra note 85, at 1084 n.110.
104. 530 U.S. 290 (2000). Note that the instrumentalist position regarding the Establishment
Clause is even more insistent on a rigid separation of church and state than represented by the
endorsement inquiry. See generally R. Kelso, Styles of Constitutional Interpretation, supra note 2,
at 223 (discussing instrumentalist preference for Lemon v. Kurtzman, 403 U.S. 602 (1971),
particularly as applied by Justices Brennan, Marshall, Blackmun and Stevens, an approach geared to
protecting vigorously each individual's religious sensibilities and human dignity).
105. See Rodney K. Smith, Nonpreferentialism in Establishment Clause Analysis: A Response to
Professor Laycock, 65 ST. JOHN'S L. REV. 245, 249 (1991). See generally R. Kelso, Natural Law
Tradition, supra note 85, at 1076 n.84, 1085 n.l I  (discussing Justice Story's approach to the
Establishment Clause). For a suggestion that Justice Thomas shares some sympathy for this
classic/Christian mode of reasoning, see R. Kelso, Natural Law Tradition, supra note 85, at 1084-
85; R. Kelso, Styles of Constitutional Interpretation, supra note 2, at 160 n. 148 (noting that Justice
Thomas commented during his confirmation hearing that "to understand what the framers meant...
it is important to go back and attempt to understand what they believed," which was a theory of
"natural rights." But consistent with Justice Kennedy's statement in Alden v. Maine, 527 U.S. 706,
734 (1999), that the Court's task is only to determine the founder's understandings, Justice Thomas
noted, "[y]ou don't refer to natural law or any other law beyond that document [the Constitution].").
In general, formalist and Holmesian judges share the accommodationist approach to the
Establishment Clause based upon their view that this approach is consistent with the specific intent
of the framers and ratifiers, and the Holmesian preference for deference to government. See
generally Lee v. Weisman, 505 U.S. 577, 631 (1992) (Scalia, J., dissenting) (claiming the
Establishment Clause should not invalidate longstanding traditions and should be applied using the
government policies of accommodation); Wallace v. Jaffree, 472 U.S. 38, 91 (1985) (Rehnquist, J.,
dissenting) (arguing that the Establishment Clause is misapplied if construed in light of Jefferson's
statement that the Clause was intended to separate church and state). Thus, though not explicitly
adopting the classic/Christian mode of reasoning, application of this approach would be consistent
with the results reached by the dissent in Santa Fe Indep. Sch. Dist. v. Doe, 530 U.S. 290, 318
viewing the framers and ratifiers as holding a balanced view between
classic/Christian versus Enlightenment/common law approaches would
likely adopt an intermediate approach between these two outcomes-like the
no "coercion" or proselytizing test propounded by Justice Kennedy in his
opinion in Lee v. Weisman."
Views about contract and property rights, critical for Contract Clause
and Takings Clause analyses, are also influenced by which natural law
tradition the Justice holds. Similar to the issue of state sovereign immunity,
the early Enlightenment approach of John Locke, the classic/Christian
tradition of writers like William Blackstone, and the views of some of the
early Justices on the Supreme Court, including John Marshall and Joseph
Story, share a similar position-strongly supportive of individual contract
and property rights.' 7 The later Enlightenment/common law approach
placed less emphasis on individual property rights, and more emphasis on
the ability of the state to regulate property and contract matters. '5 The
classic early case where the Court split on this issue was the famous case of
Proprietors of the Charles River Bridge v. Proprietors of the Warren
Bridge, Co. 9 In that case, the majority adopted the Enlightenment/common
law approach, permitting a state legislature to change a monopoly grant to
use of a bridge."'  The dissent, per Justice Story, adopted the early
(2000) (Rehnquist, C.J., dissenting).
106. 505 U.S. 577, 589-92 (1992). In Weisman, Justice Kennedy concluded that a
nondenominational prayer at a high school graduation would involve coercion, rejecting the
formalist argument that students do not have to attend graduation and therefore no coercion is
involved. Id. at 593-95. As Justice Kennedy stated, "The argument lacks all persuasion. Law
reaches past formalism. And to say a teenage student has a real choice not to attend her high school
graduation is formalistic in the extreme." Id. at 595. For discussion of the "coercion" approach
generally, see Michael W. McConnell, Coercion: The Lost Element of Establishment, 27 WM. &
MARY L. REV. 933 (1986).
107. See generally DOUGLAS W. KMIEC & STEPHEN B. PRESSER, AMERICAN CONSTITUTIONAL
ORDER: HISTORY, CASES, AND PHILOSOPHY 759-78, 800-09 (1998) (discussing, inter alia, the views
of Justices Marshall and Story on the importance of contract and property rights against a backdrop
of Lockean political philosophy, the views of William Blackstone, and the Protestant natural law
tradition in general).
108. See generally Lynda J. Oswald, Property Rights Legislation and the Police Power, 37 AM.
Bus. L.J. 527, 535 (2000) (noting that while John Locke stressed the critical importance of private
property rights, "[p]rotection of private property rights.., has never been an absolute in the U.S.
legal system."); William Michael Treanor, The Original Understanding of the Takings Clause and
the Political Process, 95 COLUM. L. REV. 782, 792 (1995) ("[T]he majority view was that
consequential damages-those from activities that did not involve physical invasions or
appropriations of property for a public use, but that nonetheless had physical consequences, such as
subsidence occasioned by a road-building project-were not compensable takings"); Sax, supra note
86, at 54-55 (discussing Seventeenth and Eighteenth century philosophers Pufendorf, Burlamaqui,
and Vattel, and citing them for the proposition that government has "the duty so to regulate and
adjust economic power so to 'make life pleasant and agreeable' for all the 'fellow creatures' in the
society.") (quoting THE LAW OF NATIONS, Bk. I, ch. VIII, § 88 (1758)).
109. 36 U.S. (II Pet.) (1837).
110. Id. at 547-48
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Enlightenment and classic/Christian approach, protecting the individual
from a newly imposed burden of competition when the individual had
initially been granted monopoly rights."'
One can see the same kind of tension among Justices O'Connor,
Kennedy and Souter in cases involving the Takings Clause today. As with
the state sovereign immunity cases, typically Justices O'Connor and
Kennedy opt for the early Enlightenment and classic/Christian approach,
while Justice Souter opts for the more well developed, later
Enlightenment/common law approach. For example, in Eastern Enterprises
v. Apfel,"' Justice O'Connor, in a plurality opinion, held that an
unconstitutional taking occurred when a statute imposed upon a coal
company a large, retroactive liability for lifetime health care of former
employees and their families."' Justice Kennedy concurred in the result,
though he found the retroactivity of the statute violated due process without
regard to a Takings Clause analysis."' In contrast, Justice Souter joined the
dissent, which noted that the defendant, while still in the coal business, had
participated in negotiations with other operators and miners where there was
an implicit understanding on all sides "that the operators would provide the
miners with lifetime health benefits." Thus, new burdens were foreseeable
and could be constitutionally imposed, thus upholding the state regulatory
initiative in the case."1
5
[T]he object and end of all government is to promote the happiness and prosperity of the
community by which it is established; and it can never be assumed that the government
intended to diminish its power of accomplishing the end for which it was created .... A
State ought never to be presumed to surrender this power [to public grants], because, like
the taxing power, the whole community has an interest in preserving it undiminished.
Id.
11. Id. at 604, 608 (Story, J., dissenting).
It is a contract, whose obligation cannot be constitutionally impaired.... For my own
part, I can conceive of no surer plan to arrest all public improvements, founded on private
capital and enterprise, than to make the outlay of that capital uncertain and questionable
both as to security and as to productiveness.
Id. For a discussion of Nineteenth century Takings Clause cases, which also favored the later
Enlightenment/ common law approach, and which thus placed great emphasis on the ability of
government to act for the public interest, see Treanor, supra note 108, at 794-97 ("'[A]cts done in
the proper exercise of governmental powers, and not directly encroaching upon private property,
though their consequences may impair its use, are universally held not to be a taking within the
meaning of the constitutional provision."') (quoting N. Transp. Co. v. Chicago, 99 U.S. 635, 642
(1879)).
112. 524 U.S. 498 (1998).
113. Id.at538.
114. Id. at 539, (Kennedy, J., concurring in the judgment and dissenting in part).
115. Id. at 550-51 (Stevens, J., dissenting); id. at 553-54 (Breyer, J., dissenting).
A similar split occurred in Phillips v. Washington Legal Foundation.'6
The majority, which included Justices O'Connor and Kennedy, followed the
strong property rights view typical of John Locke and the classic/Christian
tradition in holding that interest earned on a client's funds held in a state-
created IOLTA program were property of the client.' " The four-Justice
dissent, including Justice Souter, followed a Charles River Bridge approach
deferential to state regulatory initiatives and held that because "'absent the
[state-created] IOLTA program' no 'interest' could have been earned" on
the trust funds, "the interest earned is not the client's 'private property.""'"
C. Natural Law Versus Formalist, Holmesian, and Instrumentalist
Decision-making Styles
A third reason that might lead judges operating out of the same natural
law/common law judicial decision-making tradition to disagree in some
cases might be that the judge has some sympathy for some strength in one of
the other decision-making styles. This sympathy could lead to differing
results in close cases.
For example, a natural law judge might have sympathy for the formalist
emphasis on certainty and predictability in the law." 9 Thus, a natural law
judge with some formalist leanings, like Justice Kennedy,'2° might prefer
116. 524 U.S. 156 (1998).
117. Id. at 172 ("The rule that 'interest follows principal' has been established under English
common law since at least the mid-1700's. Not surprisingly, this rule has become firmly embedded
in the common law of the various States.") (citations omitted).
118. Id. at 183 (Breyer, J., dissenting). See also Palazzolo v. Rhode Island, 533 U.S. 606, 619-32
(2001) (explaining that the Penn Central balancing test can apply even to a petitioner who acquired
the property after the government restriction upon the property was enacted; dissenting Justices
Stevens, Souter, Ginsburg, and Breyer would have refused to address this issue either on ripeness or
standing grounds); City of Monterey v. Del Monte Dunes, Ltd., 526 U.S. 687, 714-15, 733-740
(1999) (holding that in a regulatory takings case seeking damages under § 1983 the case is properly
submitted to a jury, as is typical in actions at common law (citing 3 WILLIAM BLACKSTONE
COMMENTARIES Ch. 12-13 (1768)); the dissent, per Justice Souter, focused on actual common law
practice, both at time of ratification and thereafter, to hold that the action was analogous to an
ordinary condemnation proceeding where no jury is required. Based upon this strong showing of
practice, Justice O'Connor joined the dissent, as did Justices Ginsburg and Breyer. Surprisingly,
Justice Stevens joined the majority, perhaps better to protect the rights of individuals by a jury trial).
119. On the formalist desire for certainty and predictability in the law, see supra note 30 and
accompanying text. This is particularly true given that the natural law and formalist theories share
an affinity for analytic, as opposed to functional, approaches to the law. From an analytic
perspective, logical consistency and predictability in doctrinal categories are critically important. On
this aspect of natural law and formalist theory, see R. Kelso, Separation of Powers, supra note 4, at
536 n.18, 546-52. For how natural law and formalist theories disagree with Holmesian and
instrumentalist theories on this point, see id. at 536-38, 541-45.
120. See R. Kelso, Separation of Powers, at 600 n.262, and sources cited therein (noting that
"[m]ore than Justice O'Connor has done, Justice Kennedy has flirted with the Scalia view of using
literal text and a rigid view of tradition to curb expansive interpretation of constitutional
protections.") (quoting Paul M. Barrett, Despite Expectations, Scalia Fails to Unify Conservatives on
the Court, WALL ST. J., Apr. 28, 1992, at A6). On the other hand, Justice Kennedy is in no sense a
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more certain, predictable, and rigid First Amendment categories, as did
Justice Kennedy when he joined the dissent in Madsen v. Women's Health
Center, Inc."' and Hill v. Colorado.'2 2  Justice Kennedy's occasional
preference for formalism also appeared in his joining dissents in a Sixth
Amendment case,'23 and in two cases involving rights of Native
Americans.'24 An additional example of Justice Kennedy joining a formalist
dissent occurred in Brentwood Academy v. Tennessee Secondary School
Athletic Association. 
25
On the other hand, a natural judge might have some sympathy for the
Holmesian deference to the government model of decision-making, as does
committed formalist. See id. at 594-96 (discussing a range of differences between Justice Kennedy
and Justice Scalia's decision-making approaches); supra notes 26, 71, 84, 106 (giving specific
examples in this article of Justice Kennedy rejecting formalism in the application of a number of
constitutional doctrines).
121. 512 U.S. 753, 792-94 (1994) (Scalia, J., concurring in the judgment in part and dissenting in
part) (arguing that "speech-restricting injunction[s]" should always be given strict scrutiny).
122. 530 U.S. 703, 742 (2000) (Scalia, J., dissenting) (claiming that regulation of speakers around
abortion clinics is content-based, and thus should trigger traditional strict scrutiny analysis); id. at
765 (Kennedy, J., dissenting) ("In my view, Justice Scalia's First Amendment analysis is correct and
mandates outright reversal."). See also Fed. Election Comm'n v. Col. Republican Fed. Campaign
Comm., 533 U.S. 431, 488-99 (2001) (Thomas, J., dissenting) (concluding in Part I that a campaign
finance statute's limits on coordinated expenditures between a candidate and a state political party
should always be tested by strict scrutiny, and the law at issue in this case fails strict scrutiny; Part II
concludes that even under the Court's traditional Buckley analysis the regulations at issue in this case
are unconstitutional).
123. Gray v. Maryland, 523 U.S. 185, 197 (1998) (holding that only replacing a defendant's name
with a symbol of deletion in a co-defendant's confession violates the defendant's right to cross-
examine witnesses when the co-defendant refuses to testify. A more formalist dissent would have
drawn a bright-line distinction between statements that incriminate a defendant directly, and those
that only incriminate inferentially, as in this case where the defendant's name is redacted).
124. Idaho v. United States, 533 U.S. 262, 2146-50 (2001) (holding that the federal government
holds, in trust for the Coeur d'Alene Tribe, title to lands underlying portions of Lake Coeur d'Alene
and the St. Joe River in Idaho. The dissent argued that since official congressional ratification of
this trust relationship was not formally completed until after Idaho became a State, Idaho took title to
this land on the date Idaho became a State and the trust is invalid); Minnesota v. Mille Lacs Band of
Chippewa Indians, 526 U.S. 172 (1999) (holding that Chippewa Indians retain certain hunting,
fishing, and gathering rights on land they ceded to the United States in 1837, and that President
Tayler's attempt in 1850 to remove the Chippewas from the land lacked statutory or constitutional
authority; more formalist dissent argues that certainty in the law requires that when a President acts
with express or implied congressional authorization, there be a strong presumption of validity, and
that President Tayler's action in terminating these rights under the treaty should be upheld).
125. 531 U.S. 288 (2001). There, the majority held that a state high school athletic association,
that includes sixteen percent private and parochial high schools, is nevertheless a state actor for
purposes of its regulatory rules because of the significant "entwinement" between the State and the
association. Id. at 314. A more formalist dissent concluded that certainty and predictability in the
law requires that the Court restrict finding state action to where the organization "performs a public
function; [is] created, coerced, or encouraged by the government; or acted in a symbiotic relationship
with the government"; the "entwinement" test is too "unclear." Id. at 315.
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Justice O'Connor.'26 Thus, Justice O'Connor can be predicted occasionally
to depart from a standard natural law analysis to give deference to a
governmental Holmesian decision. This occurred, for example, in Florida
Bar v. Went for It, Inc.,'" a case involving attorney advertising, where
Justice O'Connor wrote the majority opinion. Justice O'Connor's
occasional preference for Holmesian deference also was evident in her
joining the dissents in Crawford-El v. Britton;'2  Hohn v. United States;'9 and
L.N.S. v. Enrico St. Cyr.3
Similarly, a natural law judge might have sympathy for instrumentalist
reasoning, as both reject a positivist approach to the law, and shar the view
that the judicial task has a normative component. ' One can perhaps see this
126. See R. Kelso, Separation of Powers, supra note 4, at 602 n.266, and sources cited therein
(discussing the evolution in Justice O'Connor's voting patterns, which during her early years on the
Court in 1983 and 1984 were more Holmesian, and most similar to the voting patterns of Holmesian
judges Chief Justice Rehnquist and Justice White, while by 1989 and 1990 Justice O'Connor had
moved to joining most often Justice Kennedy and Souter, while still retaining some affinity for the
Holmesian approach). On Justice O'Connor's tenure of the Supreme Court generally, see Charles D.
Kelso & R. Randall Kelso, Sandra Day O'Connor: A Justice Who Has Made A Difference in
Constitutional Law, 32 MCGEORGE L.J. 915 (200 1).
127. 515 U.S. 618 (1995) (applying the standard intermediate scrutiny commercial speech test of
Central Hudson Gas & Elec. Corp. v. Public Serv. Comm'n of N.Y., 447 U.S. 557, 564 (1980), in a
very deferential way to uphold a government regulation of attorney advertising); id. at 635
(Kennedy, J., dissenting).
128. 523 U.S. 574 (1998) (following the standard rule that qualified immunity for government
officials exists as long as their conduct does not violate clearly established statutory or constitutional
rights of which a reasonable person would have been aware; more Holmesian dissent amends the
rule to provide greater protection for government officials by permitting immunity if the government
official can offer a legitimate reason for the action being challenged and the plaintiff cannot establish
that the offered reason is a pretext).
129. 524 U.S. 236 (1998) (holding that the Supreme Court has jurisdiction to review decisions
denying applications for certificates of appealability in habeas corpus cases; more Holmesian dissent
concluded that Congress intended to prevent further review in habeas cases unless a Court of
Appeals judge or a Circuit Justice finds a reasonable basis for an appeal).
130. 533 U.S. 289 (2001) (holding that habeas corpus writs are still permissible under certain
provisions of the Antiterrorism and Effective Death Penalty Act of 1996 and Immigrant
Responsibility Act of 1996; more Holmesian dissent holds that the relevant statutory provisions
barred habeas corpus review, thus deferring to the government by making the government action
unreviewable in court). See also Calcano-Martinez v. I.N.S., 533 U.S. 348 (2001) (reaching the
same conclusion that the relevant statutes do not clearly strip district courts of habeas corpus
review); Legal Services Corp. v. Velazquez, 531 U.S. 533 (2001) (holding unconstitutional as a
violation of free speech a welfare reform provision that barred attorneys funded by the federal Legal
Services Corporation from accepting cases that challenged welfare laws; more Holmesian dissent
permits government limits on individuals receiving government funds); Mitchell v. United States,
526 U.S. 314 (1999) (holding that a guilty plea does not waive the privilege of self-incrimination in
the sentencing phase of a case; more Holmesian dissent concludes that there is no reason why the
privilege against self-incrimination should shield a defendant from the natural consequences of the
defendant's uncooperativeness at the sentencing phase). For a pre-Casey example of Justice
O'Connor joining a Holmesian dissent in a free speech case, see Texas v. Johnson, 491 U.S. 397
(1989) (Rehnquist, C.J., joined by White, J., & O'Connor, J., dissenting) (departing from standard
First Amendment analysis, more Holmesian dissent creates a special exception permitting
governments to ban flag burning).
131. See R. Kelso, Separation of Powers, supra note 4, at 546-52. Of course, the normative task
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influence in some of Justice Souter's opinions, as in his approach to racial
redistricting cases, where in order to support racial redistricting in favor of
minority groups, he exaggerated the difficulty of defining the cognizable
harm to grant standing and the difficulty of developing standards to govern
when a violation has taken place in Bush v. Vera.'32 Similarly, in order to
support race-based affirmative action in contracting, Justice Souter dissented
from Justice O'Connor's majority opinion in Adarand Constructors, Inc. v.
Pena,'33 which held that traditional strict scrutiny should be applied to
federal, as well as state, race-based affirmative action programs."'
for natural law judges under an Enlightenment social contract theory is to follow the normative
natural law principles of the framers and ratifiers of the Constitution. Id. at 548 n.49, 551 n.52. See
also R. Kelso, Natural Law Tradition, supra note 85, at 1067. For instrumentalist judges, where
leeways exist in the law, a judge might take into account the judge's view of the social policy
consequences of a decision, an approach rejected by natural law judges. See supra notes 16, 21, 41-
42 and accompanying text; R. Kelso, Styles of Constitutional Interpretation, supra note 2, at 162-63,
213-18. It should be noted that the classic/Christian natural tradition may be slightly more receptive
to judges supplementing the framers and ratifiers' natural law principles with natural law principles
derived from other sources, including religion, because that tradition sees natural law as an
emanation of God's will and reason and is not dependent on a social contract. However, even that
tradition may stick with the framers and ratifers' natural law principles. See R. Kelso, Natural Law
Tradition, supra note 85, at 1072-73.
132. See 517 U.S. 952, 1050-64 (1996) (Souter, J., dissenting). Compare id. at 1054 n.6 ("[T]he
Court has never succeeded in identifying how much is too much, having adopted a 'predominant
purpose' test that amounts to a practical repudiation of any hope of devising a workable standard.")
with Village of Arlington Heights v. Metro. Hous. Dev. Corp., 429 U.S. 252, 270 (1977) (stating
"that discriminatory purpose was a motivating factor" a certain enough standard for traditional
discriminatory intent analysis). Justice Souter has typically been in the dissent in the Court's recent
racial redistricting cases. See, e.g., Abrams v. Johnson, 521 U.S. 74 (1997) (upholding a district
court's redistricting plan which contained only one African-American majority district in the Atlanta
area because creation of a second such district would have required subordinating Georgia's
traditional districting policies to consider race predominantly; Justice Breyer, dissenting with
Justices Stevens, Souter, and Ginsburg, argued that the court should not have departed from the
Georgia legislature's intent to create two such districts around Atlanta), and cases cited therein. But
see Easley v. Cromartie, 532 U.S. 234 (2001). Justice Breyer wrote an opinion, where Justice
O'Connor joined the four dissenters in Abrams, in concluding that use of race was not a
"predominant factor" in the redrawing of the much-litigated Twelfth Congressional District in North
Carolina; the dissent would have deferred to the factual judgment of the District Court that racial
considerations did predominate. Id.; see also id. at 1470 (Thomas, J., dissenting). In Lawyer v.
Dep't of Justice, 521 U.S. 567 (1997), Justice Souter, wrote an opinion, where the four dissenters in
Abrams were joined by Holmesian Chief Justice Rehnquist in deferring to a three-judge federal
district court's reapportionment of a Florida Senate district; the dissent did not reach the
constitutionality of the court-drawn district, but argued that the district court should first have
offered the Florida legislature a more reasonable opportunity to craft its own solution. Id.
133. 515 U.S. 200 (1995).
134. Id. at 227; id. at 264 (Souter, J., dissenting). Of course, Justice Souter's dissent may also
reflect his strong commitment to the natural law theory of precedent, and his belief that the Court
should follow the precedent of Fullilove v. Klutznick, 448 U.S. 448 (1980), absent "any of the factual
premises on which Fullilove rested as having disappeared since that case was decided." 515 U.S. at
265.
Although not the focus of this article, the same inclination towards
formalist, Holmesian, or instrumentalist decision-making styles is also
occasionally in evidence in the approach of Justices O'Connor, Kennedy,
and Souter towards issues of statutory interpretation.'35 Thus, considering
the 5-4 cases of the last four terms, Justice Kennedy will occasionally read a
statute in a more formalist fashion than Justices O'Connor and Souter.'36
Justice O'Connor will occasionally read a statute in a more Holmesian
deference to government fashion than Justices Kennedy and Souter."' And
Justice Souter will occasionally read a statute in a more instrumentalist
fashion than Justices Kennedy and O'Connor.3 In addition, sometimes both
135. On natural law, formalist, Holmesian, and instrumentalist theories of statutory interpretation,
see R. Kelso, Statutory Interpretation Doctrine, supra note 17, at 41-58; J. Kelso & C. Kelso, Four
Theories in Disarray, supra note 17, at 85-88.
136. See, e.g., Zadvydas v. Davis, 121 S. Ct. 2491, 2498-2500, 2505 (2001) (holding that a statute
providing that government "may" detain removable alien beyond ninety day statutory removal
period does not authorize indefinite detention, but instead authorizes detention only for a time
reasonably necessary to secure removal; more formalist dissent would read the statute literally to
give the Attorney General discretion to determine how long the removable alien may be detained);
Davis v. Monroe County Bd. of Educ., 526 U.S. 629, 642-43, 660 (1999) (finding that a damage
action is permissible against recipient of funds under Title IX in cases of student-on-student
harassment if the recipient is deliberately indifferent to the sexual harassment; more formalist dissent
holds that since the literal text of the law only prohibits misconduct by recipients, the discrimination
must be of a kind that is within the control of the recipient); West v. Gibson, 527 U.S. 212, 214, 224
(1999) (stating EEOC has the legal authority to require federal agencies to pay damages for
employment discrimination under Title VII; more formalist dissent argues that statutes relating to
EEOC enforcement did not clearly contain a waiver of sovereign immunity by the United States).
137. See, e.g., NASA v. Fed. Labor Relations Auth., 527 U.S. 229, 234-40, 262 (1999) (holding
that Office of the Inspector General representatives employed by NASA were representatives of
NASA, so that barring a union representative from participating in an investigation of was an
employee an unfair labor practice; more Holmesian dissent defers to NASA's position that the OIG
inspector was sufficiently independent of NASA and that the inspector was not a representative of
the agency); Nat'l. Fed'n. of Fed. Employees, Local 1309 v. Dep't of the Interior, 526 U.S. 86, 88,
102-03 (1999) (finding that Federal Labor Relations Authority has the power to order federal
agencies to bargain mid-term under a collective bargaining agreement; more Holmesian dissent
defers to each agency to decide whether to bargain mid-term or not).
138. See, e.g., FDA v. Brown & Williamson Tobacco Corp., 529 U.S. 120, 125, 162 (2000)
(stating that the FDA lacks authority to regulate tobacco products based upon lack of explicit
authorization and the FDA's long-standing view that it lacked jurisdiction; a more instrumentalist
dissent grants FDA the power to regulate tobacco based upon Congress' overall desire to protect
health and new knowledge about the effects of smoking); Dep't of Commerce v. United States
House of Representatives, 525 U.S. 316, 334 (1999) (concluding that the use of statistical sampling
in census taking not authorized by the explicit language of the Census Act; the more instrumentalist
dissent concludes that because sampling might yield a more accurate estimate of population,
sampling should be allowed to be used); Grupo Mexicana de Desarrollo v. Alliance Bond Fund, Inc.,
527 U.S. 308, 333, 340 (1999) (holding that the district court does not have power to issue a
preliminary injunction preventing defendant from transferring assets in which a non-lien or equitable
interest is claimed because such a power was historically unavailable from a court of equity; more
instrumentalist dissent argues that as a policy matter such a power would not be that troubling
because under standards governing preliminary injunctions the plaintiff must show likelihood of
success on the merits and irreparable injury in the absence of an injunction); Gebser v. Lago Vista
Indep. Sch. Dist., 524 U.S. 274, 277, 297-99 (1998) (finding that a school district was not liable for
sexual harassment of a student by a teacher unless the school district official who had authority to
institute corrective measures had notice of the teacher's misconduct and was deliberately indifferent
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Justices Kennedy and O'Connor will interpret a statute in a formalist or
Holmesian fashion, leaving Justice Souter alone, almost always therefore in
dissent, to give the principled natural law/common law interpretation of the
statute.'
39
to that information; more instrumentalist dissent permits an action, based on the policy of placing
protection of high school students above the school district's financial concerns); Allentown Mack
Sales & Serv., Inc. v. NLRB, 522 U.S. 359, 379-80, 388-89 (1998) (holding that NLRB conclusion
that an employer lacked a "good faith reasonable doubt" about a union's majority support, and thus
the employer must conduct an internal poll of employee support was not supported by record as a
whole; more instrumental dissent defers to the NLRB's conclusion, thus supporting a pro-employee
result that would have required the employer to conduct the poll.).
See also Tyler v. Cain, 121 S. Ct. 2478, 2480, 2489-90 (2001) (finding that under 28 U.S.C.
§ 2244(b)(2)(A), the constitutional rule announced in Cage v. Louisiana, 498 U.S. 39 (1990), was
not made retroactive to cases on collateral review by the Supreme Court, based upon literal holdings
of prior cases; the dissent found retroactivity based on dicta in prior court opinions); NLRB v. Ky.
River Cmty. Care, Inc., 533 U.S. 706 (2001) (holding that the NLRB's interpretation that employees
do not exercise "independent judgment" when they exercise "ordinary professional or technical
judgment" was in error; the dissent defers to the NLRB's more pro-employee interpretation);
Buckhannon Bd. & Care Home, Inc. v. W. Va. Dep't of Health & Human Res., 528 U.S. 598 (2001)
(concluding that a plaintiff is not a "prevailing party" for purposes of obtaining attorneys fees when
that party has "failed to secure a judgment on the merits or a court-ordered consent decree, but has
nonetheless achieved the desired result because the lawsuit brought about a voluntary change in the
defendant's conduct"; the dissent followed the instrumentalist-era precedents in the Courts of
Appeals to hold that plaintiff was a "prevailing party" if the plaintiff was a "catalyst" for the change
they sought); Circuit City Stores, Inc. v. Adams, 532 U.S. 105 (2001) (deciding that Federal
Arbitration Act's exclusion from coverage for "contracts of employment of seaman, railroad
employees, or any other class of workers engaged in foreign or interstate commerce" applies only to
transportation workers, following the ejusdem generis maxim of construction and recent Courts of
Appeals precedent; a more instrumentalist dissent read the exception broadly to free all employees in
interstate commerce from the enforceability of mandatory arbitration clauses).
139. See, e.g., Alexander v. Sandoval, 532 U.S. 275 (2001) (deferring to the government by
following the literal holdings of prior cases, not their more general reasoning, to conclude that
Congress did not intend a private right of action to enforce disparate-impact regulations under Title
VI of the Civil Rights Act of 1964; the dissent noted that a faithful reading of the "prevailing
principles of statutory construction" in existence at the time Congress passed the "groundbreaking
and comprehensive civil rights Act," as well as dicta in many cases interpreting this statute,
supported finding a private right of action in this case); Carter v. United States, 530 U.S. 255, 258,
275 (2000) (finding the majority deferring to government by adopting a literal approach which holds
that carrying away something from a bank with an intent to steal was not an included offense for the
crime of taking by force or violence any thing of value from a bank, because the lesser offense did
not literally include every element of the greater offense; the dissent noted that the majority departed
from the old common law rule that robbery was an aggravated form of larceny); Miller v. French,
530 U.S. 327, 337-38, 350-51 (2000) (interpreting the Prison Litigation Reform Act literally in favor
of the government to eliminate a court's traditional equitable authority to suspend an automatic stay
of relief after thirty days; Justice Souter's dissent would have remanded the case to determine
whether the statute provided sufficient time to make the required findings before determining that
the statute removed a court's traditional equitable authority); Reno v. Bossier Parish Sch. Bd., 528
U.S. 329, 336, 241-42 (2000) (deferring to government by holding that § 5 of the Voting Rights Act
does not clearly prohibit preclearance of a redistricting plan enacted with a discriminatory but
nonretrogressive purpose; the dissent holds that any purpose to give less weight to minority
D. Additional Considerations
A few cases remain to be considered in order to complete the review of
all 5-4 Supreme Court opinions over the last four terms. A number of these
cases involve Justices other than Justices O'Connor, Kennedy, and Souter
switching sides from their usual voting pattern. These cases are thus not
directly relevant to the focus of this article, though they may suggest
something about other Justices on the Court. A number of these cases
involve criminal law matters, where Justices O'Connor, Kennedy, and
Souter are split, as described earlier in this article,'40 with an unusual switch
from Justices Scalia, Thomas, or Breyer. 4' An additional criminal case with
an unusual alignment occurred in Carmell v. Texas. 42 In a few non-criminal
cases, Justice Stevens,' 43 Justice Thomas," or Justice Ginsburg, 45 have
departed from their usual voting patterns.
participation in the electoral process is a purpose to discriminate and thus abridges § 5 of the Voting
Rights Act).
140. See supra text accompanying notes 73-84 (siding with the government were Justices
O'Connor and Kennedy; Justice Souter siding with the defendant).
141. In two of these cases, both Justices Scalia and Thomas joined Justices Stevens, Souter and
Ginsburg to treat sentence enhancement provisions as the formal equivalent of a separate offense,
thus requiring proof to a jury beyond a reasonable doubt of the elements of that sentence
enhancement. See Appendi v. New Jersey, 530 U.S. 466 (2000) (explaining that any fact, other than
recidivism, that increases the penalty for a crime beyond the prescribed statutory maximum must be
submitted to a jury and proved beyond a reasonable doubt); Jones v. United States, 526 U.S. 227
(1999) (holding it to be unconstitutional to remove from the jury the assessment of facts which alter
the congressionally prescribed range of penalties to which a criminal defendant is exposed). In two
earlier sentence enhancement cases, only Justice Scalia joined Justices Stevens, Souter, and
Ginsburg, and thus they were in the dissent. See Monge v. California, 524 U.S. 721 (1998)
(concluding in dissent that where an appellate court finds the evidence at trial insufficient to sustain
an enhancement finding, the state does not get a second chance to prove enhancement because the
initial finding was a functional acquittal on the enhancement charge); Almendarez-Torres v. United
States, 523 U.S. 224 (1998) (dissenting that a possible twenty-year term if alien deportation is
subsequent to a conviction for aggravated felony is a separate crime, because Congress would have
been aware of a constitutional question of enhancement for recidivism).
Justice Breyer joined Justices O'Connor and Kennedy in siding with the government's
position in each of these cases, as well as in Muscarello v. United States, 524 U.S. 125 (1998)
(finding that a mandatory 5-year term for a person who "uses or carries a firearm" during and in
relation to a "drug trafficking crime" includes carrying a firearm in the locked glove compartment of
a vehicle). Note that Justice Breyer also adopted a deference to the government approach to create a
five person majority in Florida Bar v. Went for It, Inc., discussed supra note 127, and joined
deference to government dissents in Sims v. Apfel, United States v. Playboy Enter. Group, Inc., and
California Dental Ass'n v. FTC, discussed infra notes 144, 152, 155 respectively.
142. 529 U.S. 513, 516-530, 553-555 (2000). Justices Scalia and Thomas joined with Justices
Stevens, Souter, and Breyer to hold that the Ex Post Facto Clause applied to a Texas law because
that law, which "authorized conviction of certain sexual offenses on the victim's testimony alone"
rather than requiring a "corroborating witness," literally altered "the legal rules of evidence,"
triggering the Ex Post Facto clause; the dissent viewed the law as a "witness competency rule"
which prior Court precedents had held "validly may be applied to offenses committed before its
enactment." Id.
143. See Shalala v. I11. Council on Long Term Care, Inc., 529 U.S. 1 (2000) (holding that federal-
question jurisdiction does not extend to a challenge by an association of nursing homes to
regulations promulgated by the Secretary of Health and Human Services, and that the case must first
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A second group of cases involve Justices O'Connor, Kennedy, and
Souter substantially agreeing on the relative legal standard to be applied, but
disagreeing about some aspect of how the facts in the particular case apply
to the law. For example, in Stenberg v. Carhart,'46 Justices O'Connor and
Souter joined in Justice Breyer's majority opinion to strike down as
unconstitutional Nebraska's ban on partial-birth abortion. In the view of the
majority opinion, the Nebraska statute did not contain, as required by Casey,
a sufficient exception to permit a partial-birth abortion when necessary to
preserve the life or health of the mother.' 7 In contrast, Justice Kennedy, in
dissent, concluded that the Nebraska statute did indeed have a sufficient
exception for the life or health of the mother, and thus he concluded that the
statute was constitutional.'
go through normal administrative hearings; the more formalist dissent of Justices Thomas, Scalia,
and Kennedy, based on following the Court's traditional presumption of pre-enforcement review,
was joined by Justice Stevens, possibly because of a practical concern that in this context delaying
judicial review until after agency action might mean no review at all).
144. In a couple of cases, Justice Thomas has favored the rights of parties who were at a
disadvantage relative to the government, either because of lacking resources or a burdensome
statutory scheme. See Sims v. Apfel, 530 U.S. 103 (2000) (holding by Justices Stevens, O'Connor,
Souter, Thomas and Ginsburg that a social security claimant does not waive judicial review of an
issue even though the claimant fails to exhaust that issue by presenting it to the Social Security
Appeals Council for review); United States v. Bajakajian, 524 U.S. 321 (1998) (holding by Justices
Stevens, Souter, Thomas, Ginsburg, and Breyer that forfeiture of entire amount of money, $357,144,
merely for failure to report the money was concealed in defendant's luggage, was a violation of the
Excessive Fines Clause; dissent concluded that forfeiture was not unconstitutional because the crime
was serious, the defendant's smuggling and failure to report was willful, and was followed by many
lies about the money).
145. See National Credit Union Admin. v. First Nat'l Bank & Trust, 522 U.S. 479 (1998) (finding
that banks have standing under the Administrative Procedure Act to challenge an administrative rule
permitting credit unions to be composed of unrelated employer groups, and thus to offer more
competition for banks; Justice O'Connor, dissenting with Justices Stevens, Souter, and Breyer,
argued that avoiding competitive injury to plaintiff banks was not arguably within the zone of
interests of the statute, and thus the majority was depriving the zone of interest test of any real
content). This case is complicated by the fact that while the dissent may have a more practical view
of the zone of interest test, recent cases suggest that the zone of interest test has become something
of an anomaly in the law, applicable rarely outside the context of the APA, see Charles D. Kelso &
R. Randall Kelso, Standing to Sue: Transformation in Supreme Court Methodology, Doctrine, and
Results, 28 U. TOL. L. REV. 93, 146 (1996) ("All of these considerations suggest that the modern
Court will not extend the use of the zone of interest test much beyond the confines of section 702 of
the [APA]."), and now not used much within the APA either. In addition to Nat'l Credit Union, see
Bennett v. Spears, 520 U.S. 154 (1997) (recognizing that developers have standing under the
Endangered Species Act because the Act represents a balance between environmental and developer
interests, making virtually any party with an Article III injury-in-fact within the zone of interest of
the Act).
146. 530 U.S. 914 (2000).
147. Id. at 938 ("Requiring such an exception in this case is no departure from Casey, but simply a
straightforward application of its holding.").
148. Id. at 967 (Kennedy, J., dissenting) ("Substantial evidence supports Nebraska's conclusion
A second factual disagreement occurred in Boy Scouts of America v.
Dale.'9  There, Justices O'Connor and Kennedy joined Chief Justice
Rehnquist's opinion which held that since the Boy Scouts had sufficiently
indicated that their organization disapproved of homosexual activity, the
Boy Scouts could exclude an avowed homosexual from being a scoutmaster
as part of the Boy Scout's First Amendment freedom of association.'5 °
Justice Souter, in dissent, joined by Justices Ginsburg and Breyer, concluded
that the Boy Scouts had not clearly enough identified their organization as
anti-homosexual, and thus they could not exclude this individual until their
position was clearer. 5
A third factual disagreement occurred in United States v. Playboy
Entertainment Group, Inc.'52 In this case, the majority opinion, written by
Justice Kennedy, and joined by Justice Souter, invalidated a government
regulation banning cable operators from showing sexually-oriented
programming unless the programming is fully blocked or shown only when
children are not likely to be in the audience, set by administrative regulation
as between ten o'clock p.m. and six o'clock a.m. Justice Kennedy's opinion
concluded the regulation was infirm because the government had not shown
that the alternative of allowing customers to have their transmissions
blocked would be an ineffective, less burdensome alternative.' 5 The dissent,
joined by Justice O'Connor, concluded that as a factual matter that
that its law denies no woman a safe abortion.").
149. 530 U.S. 640 (2000).
150. Id. at 656 ("The Boy Scouts has a First Amendment right to choose to send one message but
not the other. The fact that the organization does not trumpet its views from the housetops, or that it
tolerates dissent within its ranks, does not mean that its views receive no First Amendment
protection.").
151. Id. at 701 (Souter, J., dissenting) ("[N]o group can claim a right of expressive association
without identifying a clear position to be advocated over time in an unequivocal way."). In his
dissent, which was joined by these other Justices, Justice Stevens appeared to go further to suggest
that even if the Boy Scouts took a clear position against homosexuality, they had no constitutional
right to deny an avowed homosexual the ability to be a scoutmaster. Id.
That such prejudices are still prevalent and that they have caused serious and tangible
harm to countless members of the class New Jersey seeks to protect are established
matters of fact that neither the Boy Scouts or the Court disputes. That harm can only be
aggravated by the creation of a constitutional shield for a policy that is itself the product
of a habitual way of thinking about strangers.
Id. at 700 (Stevens, J., dissenting). However, as Justice Souter noted in his dissent,
The fact that we are cognizant of [a] laudable decline in stereotypical thinking on
homosexuality should not, however, be taken to control the resolution of this case. Boy
Scouts of America (BSA) is entitled, consistently with its own tenets and the open doors
of American courts, to raise a federal constitutional basis for resisting the application of
New Jersey's law.
Id. at 701.
152. 529 U.S. 803 (2000).
153. Id. at 816 ("When a plausible, less restrictive alternative is offered to a content-based speech
restriction, it is the Government's obligation to prove that the alternative will be ineffective to
achieve its goals. The Government has not met that burden here.").
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alternative would not be effective because of the difficulty in notifying
parents of their rights and problems with blocking technology. Thus, the
dissent concluded that the government regulation was valid because the
proposed, less burdensome alternative would not be effective.5 '
A fourth factual disagreement occurred in California Dental Association
v. Federal Trade Commission.'" In this case, Justice Souter, joined by Chief
Justice Rehnquist, and Justices O'Connor, Scalia, and Thomas, concluded
that the FrC's attempt through a "quick look" analysis to ban the Dental
Association's limitations on discount advertising was invalid because it was
not that clear that the rule had the met anticompetitive effects stated by the
FrC. "6  In contrast, Justice Breyer's dissent concluded that the Dental
Association's rules did have a clear potential for genuine adverse effects on
competition; thus the FTC's ban was justified under the "quick look"
doctrine.'57
154. Id. at 843-45 (Breyer, J., dissenting) ("[Tihe record contains considerable evidence that those
problems matter, i.e., evidence of endlessly delayed phone call responses, faulty installations,
blocking failures, and other mishaps .... All these considerations show that § 504's opt-out, even
with the Court's plan for 'better notice,' is not similarly effective in achieving the [statute's]
legitimate goals .... ).
155. 526 U.S. 756 (1999).
156. Id. at 781 ("[A] less quick look was required for the initial assessment of the tendency of
these professional advertising restrictions. Because the Court of Appeals did not scrutinize the
assumption of relative anticompetitive tendencies, we vacate the judgment .... ").
157. Id. at 784 (Breyer, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part) ("I should have thought that
the anticompetitive tendencies of the three restrictions were obvious."). An additional factual
disagreement occurred in Bragdon v. Abbott, 524 U.S. 624 (1998). In this case, Justice Souter joined
Justices Kennedy's majority opinion, which held that respondent's asymptomatic HIV met the
statutory definition of a disability, in that it substantially limited her ability to reproduce and bear
children. Id. at 646. Justice O'Connor did not join the majority opinion, concluding that
[Respondent] has not proved that her asymptomatic HIV status substantially limited one
or more of her major life activities. In my view, the act of giving birth to a child, while a
very important part of the lives of many women, is not generally the same as the
representative major life activities of all persons-"caring for one's self, performing
manual tasks, walking, seeing, hearing, speaking, breathing, learning, and working"-
listed in regulations relevant to the Americans with Disabilities Act of 1990.
Id. at 664-65 (O'Connor, J., concurring in the judgment in part and dissenting in part). Chief Justice
Rehnquist, and Justices Scalia and Thomas, dissented in the case. Id. at 657.
A further disagreement occurred in Printz v. United States, 521 U.S. 898 (1997). In an
earlier case, New York v. United States, 505 U.S. 144, 161 (1992), Justices O'Connor, Kennedy, and
Souter all agreed that under the Tenth Amendment, Congress cannot "commandeer" a State's
legislative process for federal ends. In Printz, all suggested in dicta that Congress can commandeer
State judicial officers. 521 U.S. at 906-08; id. at 939 (Stevens, J., dissenting). The Justices
disagreed, however, on whether Congress can commander State executive officers. Based on his
reading of the Federalist Papers, Justice Souter concluded that framers intended the federal
government to be able to commandeer state executive officers. Id. at 971-76 (Souter, J., dissenting).
The majority opinion, joined by Justices O'Connor and Kennedy, read the Federalist Papers
differently, and in support of the proposition that no commandeering of state executive officers was
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A fifth factual disagreement occurred in Nguyen v. I.N.S.'5' In this case,
all the Justices agreed that the gender discrimination involved in a
citizenship statute that imposed different requirements for the child's
citizenship depending upon whether the citizen parent is the mother or the
father triggered an intermediate scrutiny approach. Justice Kennedy, joined
by Chief Justice Rehnquist, and Justices Stevens, Scalia, and Thomas,
concluded that the statute could pass intermediate scrutiny.'59 In dissent,
Justice O'Connor, joined by Justices Souter, Ginsburg, and Breyer,
concluded that the statute was not substantially related to important
government interests, and thus could not pass intermediate scrutiny.'"
A final case involving a factual disagreement, and one perhaps of major
proportions, occurred in Bush v. Gore.'6' While Justices O'Connor,
Kennedy, and Souter all agreed that there were equal protection problems
with the recount ordered by the Florida Supreme Court,6 ' Justices O'Connor
and Kennedy concluded there was no way factually for a constitutionally
adequate recount to be completed in time. '  In contrast, Justice Souter
concluded that the majority should not presume that a constitutionally
adequate recount could not be completed in time."
contemplated. Id. at 910-15.
An additional factual disagreement occurred in Geier v. American Honda Motor Co., Inc.,
529 U.S. 861 (2000). In this case, the majority concluded that federal rules regarding air bag
installation preempted a state common-law "no airbag" action because the federal law, rather than
merely setting "a minimum airbag standard," made clear that "the standard deliberately provided the
manufacturer with a range of choices among different passive restraint devices." Id. at 874-75.
Justice Stevens' dissent, joined by Justices Souter, Thomas, and Ginsburg, concluded that
[Tlhe objectives that the Secretary [of Transportation] intended to achieve through the
adoption of [the federal standards] would not be frustrated one whit by allowing state
courts to determine whether in 1987 [when the car at issue in the case was manufactured]
the life-saving advantages of airbags had become sufficiently obvious that their omission
might constitute a design defect in some new cars.
Id. at 888. See also Lorillard Tobacco v. Reilly, 533 U.S. 525 (2001) (holding that federal law
preempts state and local regulation of tobacco advertising; Justice Stevens, joined in dissent by
Justices Souter, Ginsburg, and Breyer, concluded that Congress did not intend to preempt such state
and local regulation).
158. 533 U.S. 53 (2001).
159. Id. at 123-34.
160. Id. at 134-50 (O'Connor, J., dissenting).
161. 531 U.S. 98 (2000) (per curiam).
162. Id. at Ill ("Seven Justices of the Court agree that there are constitutional problems with the
recount ordered by the Florida Supreme Court .. "); id. at 134 (Souter, J., dissenting) ("I can
conceive of no legitimate state interest served by these differing treatments of the expressions of
voters' fundamental rights.").
163. Id. at 110 ("[It is obvious that the recount cannot be conducted in compliance with the
requirements of equal protection and due process without substantial additional work.").
164. Id. at 135 (Souter, J., dissenting) ("Unlike the majority, I see no warrant for this Court to
assume that Florida could not possibly comply ... before the date set for the meeting of electors,
December 18.... There is no justification for denying the State the opportunity to try to count all
disputed ballots now."). It should be noted that Justices O'Connor, Kennedy, and Souter did
disagree on whether the Court should have taken the case at all. Strong arguments made in
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IV. THE THREE JUSTICES ANALYZED PER MITCHELL V. HELMS
The Supreme Court's recent decision in Mitchell v. Helms'6' provides a
good opportunity to examine the three different points of stress at work. The
basic issue in Mitchell was whether governmental aid in the form of
"secular, neutral, and nonideological" educational materials and equipment
to public and private schools violated the Establishment Clause if some of
the private schools receiving this aid had religious affiliations.' Justices
Souter, O'Connor, and Kennedy each joined different opinions in the case,
reflecting different approaches to the three varied points of stress, as
discussed above.
dissenting opinions in Bush v. Gore suggested that the case was either a political question, or was
not yet ripe for resolution. Id. at 129 (Souter, J., dissenting)
If this Court had allowed the State to follow the course indicated by the opinions of its
own Supreme Court, it is entirely possible that there would ultimately have been no issue
requiring our review, and political tension could have worked itself out in the Congress
following the procedures provided in 3 U.S.C. § 15.
Id. (Souter, J., dissenting).
[T]he Twelfth Amendment commits to Congress the authority and responsibility to count
electoral votes .... [Tihere is no reason to believe that federal law either foresees or
requires resolution of such a political issue by this Court. Nor, for that matter, is there
any reason to think that the Constitution's Framers would have reached a different
conclusion.
Id. at 153-54 (Breyer, J., dissenting). The majority per curiam opinion did not directly address these
issues of ripeness and political questions. Justice Scalia did address indirectly the ripeness argument
in his concurrence to the Emergency Stay Order, which also served as a grant of a petition for
certiorari in the case. See Bush v. Gore, 531 U.S. 1046 (2000) (Emergency Stay Order) (Scalia, J.,
concurring) ("irreparable harm" would result to "petitioner Bush, and to the country, by casting a
cloud upon what he claims to be the legitimacy of his election"). One can ask, however, whether it
was ripe to conclude there would be a "cloud" on the "legitimacy" of the election if Congress were
simply allowed to follow the constitutionally proscribed procedures for counting electoral votes
without prior court intervention? During oral argument in the case, Justice Kennedy did observe that
there are judicially manageable standards under the Equal Protection Clause to govern resolution of
this dispute, thus making reference to one of the six factors used in Baker v. Carr, 369 U.S. 186, 217
(1962), to determine if a political question exists. The opposing political questions argument is that
while the Court routinely addresses equal protection complaints regarding elections, the issue of
selecting electors is a special circumstance under the Twelfth Amendment, which commits to
Congress the responsibility to count electoral votes, and under Article II, sec. 1, cl. 2 of the
Constitution, which commits the method of selecting electors to the exclusive power of the State
legislature, see Bush v. Palm Beach County Canvassing Bd., 531 U.S. 70, 76 (2000) ("'[Iln such
manner as the legislature thereof may direct' means that this exclusive legislative power cannot be
circumscribed by the Florida Constitution); cf Nixon v. United States, 506 U.S. 224 (1993)
(explaining that the "sole" power of Senate to try impeachments means 'Senate decisions regarding
impeachment are political questions not subject to Court review even if the Senate procedures would
otherwise violate equal protection). Thus, under these provisions, there are "textually demonstrable
constitutional commitments" to "coordinate political department[s]," and thus the issue is a political
question. Baker v. Carr, 369 U.S. at 217.
165. 530 U.S. 793 (2000).
166. Id. at 802.
A. Justice Souter
As suggested above, Justice Souter has a strong natural law commitment
to precedent, and believes the framers and ratifiers had an
Enlightenment/common law commitment to natural law, and occasionally
has demonstrated some sympathy for an instrumentalist decisionmaking
style.' 6 These leanings are all on display in his dissent in Mitchell, which
was joined by Justices Stevens and Ginsburg."' In this dissent, Justice
Souter demonstrated a strong commitment to existing Establishment Clause
precedent, 69 and a strong belief in the Enlightenment vision of "separation of
church and state."'70 Further, Justice Souter demonstrated a preference for
the instrumentalist-era phrasing of Establishment clause doctrine, which
holds that a "substantial risk" that neutral aid will be diverted for religious
use is enough to invalidate a government aid program. 7' These
considerations caused Justice Souter to conclude that the government
program at issue in Mitchell was unconstitutional.'72
B. Justice O'Connor
As suggested above, Justice O'Connor has a medium natural law
commitment to precedent, believes the framers and ratifiers shared the
Enlightenment/common law vision of natural law, particularly its Lockean
vision, and has occasionally demonstrated some sympathy for a Holmesian
deference to government decision-making style.' These leanings are on
display in her concurrence in Mitchell.'74 In her concurrence, Justice
O'Connor bases her opinion on her "endorsement" approach to the
Establishment Clause,'75  which, as noted above, derives from an
Enlightenment view about the relationship between church and state.
7 6
However, Justice O'Connor has been willing to depart in Establishment
Clause cases from the more extreme version of the separation of church and
state concept evidenced in some of the opinions of the instrumentalist era.'77
167. See supra notes 62-84, 94-118, 131-39, 146-47 and accompanying text.
168. 530 U.S. at 867 (Souter, J., dissenting).
169. See id. at 870-899.
170. Id. at 873 (quoting Everson v. Bd. of Educ., 330 U.S. 1, 15-16 (1947) ("In the words of
Jefferson, the clause against establishment of religion by law was intended to erect 'a wall of
separation between Church and State."').
171. Id. at 909 ("A substantial risk of diversion in this case was more than clear, as the plurality
has conceded. The First Amendment was violated.").
172. Id. at 911-13.
173. See supra notes 67-83, 96-113, 126-130, 135, 137, 139 and accompanying text.
174. 530 U.S. 836 (O'Connor, J., concurring).
175. Id. at 838-44.
176. See supra notes 106-108 and accompanying text.
177. See 530 U.S. at 844-47 (embracing Agostini v. Felton, 521 U.S. 203 (1997), and its rejection
of the presumption in Aguilar v. Felton, 473 U.S. 402 (1985) and Sch. Dist. of Grand Rapids v. Ball,
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In this case, absent a showing of actual diversion, Justice O'Connor was not
willing to assume that either the government or the schools would wrongly
divert secular aid for religious purposes. 78  Justice O'Connor followed a
Holmesian approach and counseled that the Court should defer to the
government and schools since, on its face, secular, neutral aid does not
constitute a government endorsement of religion.' 79
C. Justice Kennedy
As suggested above, Justice Kennedy has a medium natural law
commitment to precedent, believes the framers and ratifiers shared a mixture
of classic/Christian and Enlightenment/common law visions of natural law,
and has occasionally demonstrated some sympathy for a formalist decision-
making style.'80 These leanings were on display in his joining with Justice
Thomas' plurality opinion in Mitchell.'"' The plurality opinion in Mitchell
concluded that as long as the government aid was distributed equally to
public and private schools, then no serious Establishment Clause claim
could be raised."2 By removing from consideration how the aid was being
used, it raised predictability and certainty in the law, a formalist concern.' 83
The opinion reflected an accommodationist view of the Establishment
Clause, which is consistent with the classic/Christian tradition." It also
473 U.S. 373 (1985), that "the placement of public employees on parochial school grounds
inevitably results in the impermissible effect of state-sponsored indoctrination.").
178. 530 U.S. 857-60 ("To establish a First Amendment violation, plaintiffs must prove that the
aid in question actually is, or has been, used for religious purposes.").
179. Id. With regard to the question of actual diversion, Justice O'Connor was similarly
Holmesian in her approach, willing to defer to the government's position that no diversion occurred,
despite both the four Justice plurality, and three Justice dissent, disagreeing with her analysis on this
point. See id. at 861. Instead, Justice O'Connor concluded that the "limited evidence amassed by
respondents during four years of discovery (which began approximately fifteen years ago) is at best
de minimis and therefore insufficient to affect the constitutional inquiry." Id. As he sometimes does
in other cases, see supra note 141, Justice Breyer joined Justice O'Connor in adopting this
Holmesian deference to government approach in Mitchell. See supra note 173.
180. See supra notes 67-83, 93-113, 119-25, 135, 139 and accompanying text.
181. 530 U.S. at 801 (Thomas, J., plurality opinion).
182. Id. at 809-25.
183. See, e.g., id. at 825 ("It is perhaps conceivable that courts could take upon themselves the
task of distinguishing among the myriad kinds of possible aid based on the ease of diverting each
kind. But it escapes us how a court might coherently draw any such line.")
184. See supra note 105-106 and accompanying text. Indeed, under this view, a finding that such
"neutral" aid is unconstitutional may be viewed as an attempt to undermine classic/Christian
traditions. See, e.g., Mitchell, 530 U.S. at 828-29
[H]ostility to aid to pervasively sectarian schools has a shameful pedigree that we do not
hesitate to disavow.... Opposition to aid to 'sectarian' schools acquired prominence in
the 1870's ... at a time of pervasive hostility to the Catholic Church and to Catholics in
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reflected a medium respect for existing Establishment Clause precedents,
along with a willingness, as in United States v. Lopez and United States v.
Morrison' to depart from instrumentalist-era precedents if those precedents
can be distinguished, are substantially wrong, or create inconsistency or
incoherence in the law.' It is thus no surprise that of the three Justices in
the Casey joint opinion, Justice Kennedy would be the one to join Justice
Thomas' plurality opinion in this case.
V. CONCLUSION
In 1992, Justices O'Connor, Kennedy, and Souter published their
famous "joint opinion" in Planned Parenthood v. Casey.'1 At the time,
many commentators predicted that these three Justices would form a
relatively reliable "block" that would control the outcome of Supreme Court
cases for the foreseeable future. However, it has not turned out that Justices
O'Connor, Kennedy, and Souter always vote together. Despite sharing the
same basic natural law/common law theory of judicial decision-making, in
close cases they will often split 2-1, sometimes with two joining the
conservative block on the Court (Chief Justice Rehnquist, and Justices
Scalia and Thomas), and other times two joining the more liberal block
(Justices Stevens, Ginsburg, and Breyer).
This article has explored these differences along three different
dimensions: whether the Justice has a strong, medium, or weak commitment
to the natural law theory of precedent; whether the Justice believes the
framers and ratifiers of the Constitution believed more in the Eighteenth
century Enlightenment/common law natural law tradition or the Eighteenth
century classic/Christian natural law tradition; and whether the Justice,
despite primarily adhering to a natural law theory of constitutional
interpretation, has some sympathies for formalist, Holmesian, or
instrumentalist decision-making styles.
The article concludes that Justice Souter has strong commitment to
precedent, to the Enlightenment/common law natural law tradition, and a
slight affinity for instrumentalism. Justice O'Connor has a medium natural
law commitment to precedent, a commitment to the Enlightenment/common
general.... This doctrine, born of bigotry, should be buried now.
Id. (citations omitted).
185. See supra notes 54-72 and accompanying text.
186. See Mitchell, 530 U.S. 835-36 (holding that Meek v. Pittenger, 421 U.S. 349 (1975) and
Wolman v. Walter, 433 U.S. 229 (1977) (holding unconstitutional various material and in-kind aid to
non-public, religious schools), were irreconcilable, and thus inconsistent, with more recent
Establishment Clause cases like Agostini v. Felton, 521 U.S. 203 (1997) (sending public school
teachers into parochial schools permissible to provide remedial education), and thus were overruled).
On inconsistency or incoherence being one of the special factors to overrule a prior precedent in the
natural law tradition, see supra note 47 and accompanying text.
187. 505 U.S. 833 (1992).
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law natural law tradition, particularly in its early Lockean form, and a slight
affinity for the Holmesian decision-making style. Justice Kennedy has a
medium natural law commitment to precedent, a balanced view concerning
the Enlightenment/common law versus classic/Christian natural law
tradition, and a slight affinity for formalism. These differences lead these
three Justices to reach different results in some cases, despite the fact that
they share the same basic decision-making philosophy.
APPENDIX A
Table 1: 5-4 Decisions of the Supreme Court Discussed in This Article, with
Citations to Where Each Case is Discussed'88
Justices Constituting the Number of Decisions in Each
Majority Court Term
1992
1996 1997 1998 1999 2000 Total
O'CONNOR/KENNEDY/SO
UTER IN THE MAJORITY
Rehnquist, O'Connor, 189
Kennedy, Souter, Ginsburg 0 0 0 0 1 1
O'CONNOR/KENNEDY
BOTH IN THE MAJORITY
Rehnquist, O'Connor, Scalia,
Kennedy, Thomas 7 6 7 12 13 45'90
Rehnquist, O'Connor, Scalia,
Kennedy, Breyer 0 0 0 1 0 1191
Rehnquist, O'Connor, 192
Kennedy, Thomas, Breyer 0 2 0 0 0 2
Stevens, O'Connor,
Kennedy, Thomas, Breyer 0 1 0 0 0 1 1
93
O'CONNOR/SOUTER
BOTH IN THE MAJORITY
Rehnquist, O'Connor, Scalia,
Souter, Thomas 0 0 1 0 0 1194
188. Only selected 5-4 opinions are considered for the 1992-96 Terms of the Court; for the 1997-
99 Terms, all 5-4 cases are considered as compiled by The Supreme Court Term issues of the
Harvard Law Review, 114 HARV. L. REV. 395 (2000); 113 HARV. L. REV. 405 (1999); 112 HARV.
L. REV. 371 (1998), plus Miller v. French, 536 U.S. 327 (2000) (not included in the HARV. L. REV.
compilation); for the 2000 Term, all 5-4 cases are considered are compiled from issues of United
States Law Week.
189. Rogers v. Tennessee, 532 U.S. 374 (2001).
190. For citations to these cases, see infra Table 3.
191. Geier v. Am. Honda Motor Co., 529 U.S. 861 (2000).
192. Almendarez-Torres v. United States, 523 U.S. 224 (1998); Monge v. California, 524 U.S.
721 (1998).
193. Muscarello v. United States, 524 U.S. 125 (1998).
194. Cal. Dental Ass'n v. FTC, 526 U.S. 756 (1999).
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Justices Constituting the Number of Decisions in Each
Majority Court Term
1992
1996 1997 1998 1999 2000 Total
Rehnquist, O'Connor, Souter,
Ginsburg, Breyer 0 0 0 1 0 1 195
Stevens, O'Connor, Souter,
Thomas, Ginsburg 0 0 0 1 0 1196
Stevens, O'Connor, Souter,
Ginsburg, Breyer 0 1 3 1 5 10'97
KENNEDY/SOUTER BOTH
IN THE MAJORITY
Rehnquist, Scalia, Kennedy,
Souter, Thomas 0 0 0 0 1 1 198
Stevens, Kennedy, Souter,
Thomas, Ginsburg 0 0 0 1 0 1 199
Stevens, Kennedy, Souter,
Ginsburg, Breyer 1 3 3 0 3 10200
ONLY O'CONNOR IN THE
MAJORITY
Rehnquist, O'Connor, Scalia,
Thomas, Breyer 1 0 0 0 0 1201
195. Shalala v. Ill. Council on Long Term Care, Inc., 529 U.S. 1 (2000).
196. Sims v. Apfel, 530 U.S. 103 (2000).
197. Zadvydas v. Davis, 533 U.S. 678 (2001); Federal Election Comm'n v. Col. Rep. Fed.
Campaign Comm., 533 U.S. 431 (2001); Idaho v. United States, 533 U.S. 262 (2001); Brentwood
Academy v. Tenn. Secondary Sch. Ath. Ass'n, 531 U.S. 288 (2001); Hunt v. Cromartie, 532 U.S.
234 (2001), supra note 126; Stenberg v. Carhart, 530 U.S. 914 (2000); West v. Gibson, 527 U.S. 212
(1999); Davis v. Monroe County Bd. of Educ., 526 U.S. 629 (1999); Minnesota v. Mille Lacs Band
of Chippewa Indians, 526 U.S. 572 (1999); Gray v. Maryland, 523 U.S. 185 (1998).
198. Atwater v. City of Lago Vista, 532 U.S. 318 (2001).
199. United States v. Playboy Entm't Group, Inc., 529 U.S. 803 (2000).
200. Calcano-Martinez v. I.N.S., 533 U.S. 348 (2001); I.N.S. v. Enrico St. Cyr, 513 U.S. 533
(2001); Legal Services Corp. v. Velazquez, 527 U.S. 229 (2001); NASA v. Fed. Labor Rel. Auth.,
527 U.S. 229 (1999); Nat'l Fed. of Employers, Local 1309 v. Dep't of the Interior, 526 U.S. 86
(1999); Mitchell v. United States, 526 U.S. 314 (1999); Bragdon v. Abbott, 524 U.S. 624 (1998);
Crawford-El v. Britton, 523 U.S. 574 (1998); Hohn v. United States, 524 U.S. 236 (1998); United
States Term Limits, Inc. v. Thornton, 514 U.S. 779 (1995).
201. Florida Bar v. Went for It, Inc., 515 U.S. 618 (1995).
Justices Constituting the Number of Decisions in Each
Majority Court Term
1992
1996 1997 1998 1999 2000 Total
ONLY KENNEDY IN THE
MAJORITY
Rehnquist, Stevens, Scalia, 202
Kennedy, Thomas 0 0 1 0 1 2
Rehnquist, Scalia, Kennedy,
Thomas, Ginsburg 0 1 0 0 0 1203
ONLY SOUTER IN THE
MAJORITY
Rehnquist, Stevens, Souter,
Ginsburg, Breyer 1 0 0 0 0 1204
Stevens, Scalia, Souter,
Thomas, Ginsburg 0 0 1 1 0 2205
Stevens, Scalia, Souter,
Thomas, Breyer 0 0 0 1 0 1206
Stevens, Souter, Thomas,
Ginsburg, Breyer 0 1 0 0 0 1207
Scalia, Souter, Thomas,
Ginsburg, Breyer 0 0 0 0 1 1208
TOTAL 10 15 16 19 25 85 29
202. Nguyen v. I.N.S., 533 U.S. 53 (2001); City of Monterey v. Del Monte Dunes at Monterey
Ltd., 526 U.S. 687 (1999).
203. Nat'l Credit Union Admin. v. First Nat'l Bank v. Trust Co., 522 U.S. 479 (1998).
204. Lawyer v. Dep't of Justice, 521 U.S. 567 (1997).
205. Appendi v. New Jersey, 530 U.S. 466 (2000); Jones v. United States, 526 U.S. 227 (1999).
206. Carmell v. Texas, 529 U.S. 513 (2000).
207. United States v. Bajakajian, 524 U.S. 321 (1998).
208. Kyllo v. United States, 533 U.S. 27 (2001).
209. For a tabulation of ultimate agreement or disagreement among Justices O'Connor, Kennedy,
and Souter in these cases, see infra Table 2.
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Table 2: Overall Pattern of Agreement or Disagreement Among Justices
O'Connor, Kennedy, and Souter in the Post-Casey 5-4 Decisions
Discussed in this Article
All 5-4 Selected 5-4
Decisions Decisions
1997-2000 1992-1996
In the Majority Dissenting Terms Terms
O'Connor,
Kennedy, Souter 1 0
O'Connor,
Kennedy Souter 42 7
O'Connor,
Souter Kennedy 13 0
Kennedy, Souter O'Connor 11 1
O'Connor Kennedy, Souter 0 1
O'Connor,
Kennedy Souter 3 0
O'Connor,
Souter Kennedy 5 1
TOTAL 75 10=85
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Table 3:Case Citations for the 45 5/4 Cases Discussed in this Article with
Chief Justice Rehnquist and Justices O'Connor, Scalia, Kennedy, and
Thomas in the Majority
A. Criminal Cases
1. Death Penalty Cases
Ramdass v. Angelone, 530 U.S. 156 (2000).
Weeks v. Angelone, 528 U.S. 225 (2000).
Jones v. United States, 527 U.S. 373 (1999).
Caleron v. Thompson, 523 U.S. 538 (1998).
2. Non-Death Penalty Cases
Daniels v. United States, 532 U.S. 374 (2001).
Lackawanna County Dist. Atty. v. Coss, 532 U.S. 394 (2001).
Texas v. Cobb, 532 U.S. 162 (2001).
Ohler v. United States, 529 U.S. 753 (2000).
Smith v. Robbins, 528 U.S. 259 (2000).
Illinois v. Wardlow, 528 U.S. 119 (2000).
Calderon v. Coleman, 525 U.S. 141 (1998).
Pennsylvania Bd. of Probation v. Scott, 524 U.S. 357 (1998).
B. Federalism Cases
1. Commerce Clause, Tenth Amendment, and Related Statutory
Interpretation Cases
Solid Waste Agency v. United States Army Corps of Eng., 531 U.S. 159
(2001).
United States v. Morrison, 529 U.S. 598 (2000).
Printz v. United States, 521 U.S. 898 (1997).
United States v. Lopez, 514 U.S. 549 (1995).
2. 1 1th Amendment and State Sovereign Immunity Cases
Board of Trustees of the Univ. of Ala. v. Garrett, 531 U.S. 98 (2001).
Kimel v. Florida Bd. of Regents, 528 U.S. 62 (2000).
Alden v. Maine, 527 U.S. 706 (1999).
College Sav. Bk. v. Florida Prepaid Postsec. Educ. Exp. Bd., 527 U.S. 666
(1999).
Florida Prepaid Postsec. Educ. Exp. Bd. v. College Sav. Bk., 527 U.S. 627
(1999).
Seminole Tribe v. Florida, 517 U.S. 44 (1996).
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C. Equal Protection Clause, Due Process Clause, and First Amendment
Cases
Bush v. Gore, 531 U.S. 98 (2000).
Boy Scouts of America v. Dale, 530 U.S. 640 (2000).
Agostini v. Felton, 521 U.S. 203 (1997).
Bush v. Vera, 517 U.S. 952 (1996).
Adarand v. Pena, 515 U.S. 200 (1995).
Abrams v. Johnson, 521 U.S. 74 (1997).
D. Contract & Takings Clause Cases
Palazzolo v. Rhode Island, 121 S. Ct. 2448 (2001).
Eastern Enterprises v. Apfel, 524 U.S. 498 (1998).
Phillips v. Washington Legal Found., 524 U.S. 156 (1998).
E. Statutory Interpretation Cases
Tyler v. Cain, 121 S. Ct.. 2478 (2001).
Lorillard Tobacco v. Reilly, 121 S. Ct. 2404 (2001).
NLRB v. Kentucky River Comm. Care, Inc., 121 S. Ct. 1861 (2001).
Alexander v. Sandoval, 121 S. Ct. 1511 (2001).
Buckannon Bd. v. West Virginia Dep't of Health & Human Res., 532 U.S.
598 (2001).
Circuit City Stores, Inc. v. Adams, 532 U.S. 105 (2001).
Miller v. French, 530 U.S. 327 (2000).
Carter v. United States, 530 U.S. 255 (2000).
Reno v. Bossier Parish Sch. Bd., 528 U.S. 320 (2000).
FDA v. Brown & Williamson Tobacco Co., 529 U.S. 120 (2000).
Dep't of Commerce v. House of Representatives, 525 U.S. 316 (1999).
Grupo Mex. de Desarrollo v. Alliance Bound Fund, Inc., 527 U.S. 308
(1999).
Gebser v. Lago Vista Indep. Sch. Dist., 524 U.S. 274 (1998).
Allentown Mack Sales & Serv. Inc. v. NLRB, 522 U.S. 359 (1998).
Table 4: Additional Noteworthy Cases Discussed in this Article,
Which Are Not 5-4 Decisions from the 1992-2000 Terms of the Court
A. 5-4 Decisions Prior to the 1992 Term of the Court
Planned Parenthood v. Casey, 505 U.S. 833 (1992).
Lee v. Weisman, 505 U.S. 577 (1992).
Texas v. Johnson, 491 U.S. 397 (1989).
B. Non-5-4 Decisions from the 1992-2000 Terms of the Court
Mitchell v. Helms, 120 S. Ct. 2530 (2000).
Hill v. Colorado, 120 S. Ct. 2480 (2000).
Santa Fe Indep. Sch. Dist. v. Doe, 530 U.S. 290 (2000).
Madsen v. Woman's Health Center, Inc., 512 U.S. 753 (1994).
